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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the European Court of Human Rights’ 
intervention in the detention of involuntary migrants. It analyzes the 
use of “carceral migration control” in response to a migration “crisis,” 
and argues that the actual crisis in the region is one of politics and 
policies rather than the magnitude of migration. It explores the 
consequences of a crisis moniker for migration, including shortsighted 
migration policies, entrenched caricatures of migrants as threatening, 
and excessive emphasis on punitive rather than humanitarian 
responses. Responding to migration as a crisis has led states in Europe 
and elsewhere to shift the movement of people across national borders 
from a human security issue—protecting people and providing 
assistance—to a national security issue. 
This Article applies the migration crisis framework to analyze 
the European states’ responses to the most recent rise in involuntary 
migration to the region. It examines the foundational principles of the 
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European human rights system with respect to migrants. Because both 
the original text of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
early judgments of the European Court of Human Rights strongly 
favored state sovereignty over migrants’ rights, the Court’s recent 
decisions on migrant detention in part have gone in a somewhat 
surprising direction. 
An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ post-crisis 
migrant detention judgments reveals that the Court held steadfast to 
the applicability of the Convention’s prohibition of deprivation of 
liberty, namely that migrant detention is in fact detention. The case law 
also shows that the Court has not deviated from its relatively recent and 
more migrant-protective analysis of whether states’ method of carceral 
migration control is lawful. Crisis discourse has, however, affected the 
Court’s treatment of migrant detention claims in judgments regarding 
the conditions in which states have held involuntary migrants under 
the specter of migration crisis control. This overall picture illustrates 
the potential of the European system to extend human rights protections 
to migrants, but also the power of persistent, ubiquitous crisis discourse 
to forgive human rights violations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the intervention of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the detention of involuntary migrants.1 It analyzes 
the construction of a migration “crisis” in Europe, and argues that the 
actual crisis is one of politics and policies rather than the movement 
of people. This characterization of crisis has normalized the use of 
carceral migration control, which in its broadest sense entails 
detention2 as a punitive response to migration.3 The Article reviews 
the jurisprudence of one of the region’s human rights protection 
mechanisms, the European Court of Human Rights, to unpack how the 
1. Compare E. Tendayi Achiume, Governing Xenophobia, 51 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 333, 335 n.2 (discussing “involuntary migrants” to convey a 
movement of forced migration), with ALEXANDER BETTS, SURVIVAL MIGRATION: 
FAILED GOVERNANCE AND THE CRISIS OF DISPLACEMENT 4 (2013) (developing the 
concept of “survival migration” to “highlight the situation of people fleeing basic 
rights deprivations rather than just persecution”), and BAS SCHOTEL, ON THE 
RIGHTS OF EXCLUSION: LAW, ETHICS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 1 (2012) (using the 
term “normal migrants” to describe “migrants who do not have a legal right to 
admission.”). When addressing migration and migrants, this article primarily 
contemplates the plight of involuntary migrants given  that the forced nature of 
involuntary migration renders crisis discourse particularly suspect. 
2. This trend has been well underway in the United States. Professor Juliet
Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration law” to describe the transformation of 
immigration detention in the United States as a product of a blurring of 
immigration and criminal law. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). A 
former high-level American immigration official admitted that the government’s 
use of detention is disconnected from its administrative purpose and instead is in 
practice a punitive system. Anita Sinha, Slavery by Another Name: “Voluntary” 
Immigrant Detainee Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 
1, 12–13 (2015) (citing DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2009), https:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
LSW3-RXLW]). 
3. This broad definition follows the Foucauldian concept of a “carceral
archipelago,” which encompasses a state security regime of brick and mortar 
incarceration and also surveillance systems and their technologies. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 297 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 
1977) (1975). A largely punitive approach not only marks a shift in migration 
control, but, as some have argued, in the meaning of punishment itself. See Mary 
Bosworth et al., Punishment, Globalization and Migration Control: “Get Them the 
Hell Out of Here,” 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 34, 39 (2018) (“Administrative practices 
such as detention and deportation not only are experienced as punishment by those 
subjected to them, but also are intended as such. In doing so, they change the role 
and social purpose of penality.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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European human rights system has and is now defining migrant 
detention, and the extent to which detention is being tolerated. 
Fleeing political upheaval in the Middle East, Africa, and 
South Asia, involuntary migrants are reshaping both migration trends 
and controls in Europe. Unauthorized border crossings in the 
European Union (“EU”) 4  began to spike in 2011 as thousands of 
Tunisians, fleeing the regime change following the rise of the Arab 
Spring, landed on the shores of the Italian island of Lampedusa.5 
Additionally, after the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi 
in 2011, many sub-Saharan Africans sought refuge in Europe as 
they were no longer encumbered by Libya’s preventive migration 
policies and could finally cross the Mediterranean. 6  Migration to 
Europe peaked in 2015,7 largely due to the conflict in Syria.8 
4. The EU, created after the end of World War II, was founded as an
economic and political project initially comprised of six countries—Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—called the European 
Economic Community, which changed its name to the European Union in 1993. See 
The History of The European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/ 
european-union/about-eu/history_en [https://perma.cc/XGM5-X247]. Today, the EU 
consists of 28 member states, constituting approximately over five hundred million 
people. See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Impact of the Court of Justice on the European 
Law Enforcement Architecture, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT: 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 166 (Hans-W Micklitz & 
Andrea Wechsler eds., 2016); see generally Oliver Patel & Alan Renwick, Brexit: 
The Consequences For Other EU Member States, UCL CONST. UNIT (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/europe/briefing-papers/Briefing-
paper-4 [https://perma.cc/2GCH-UYRK] (detailing the impact of Britain leaving the 
EU). 
5. Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(2015), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis [https://perma. 
cc/G4WL-U9KR]. 
6. Id.; see also Guna El-Gamaty, Italy and France are playing a dangerous
game in Libya, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
indepth/opinion/2017/08/italy-france-playing-dangerous-game-libya-17081510523 
0759.html [https://perma.cc/28WH-RTLW]; Amanda Sakuma, Damned for Trying, 
MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/libya [https://perma.cc/ 
ZW99-RDQ3]. 
7. Migration to Europe in charts, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699 [https://perma.cc/B2KR-49TX]. 
8. See Park, supra note 5 (describing the origins of the migrants to Europe
in 2015 and explaining that thirty-nine percent came from Syria, constituting the 
largest group); see also Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven 
Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
34131911 [https://perma.cc/4JH4-MAFX] (reporting that, in 2015, there were 
1,321,560 asylum claims within Europe). 
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The language describing the current trend of European 
migration is one of crisis, and the response in many states has been 
rooted in nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments.9 In turn, states 
are criminalizing involuntary migrants—many of whom are fleeing 
extreme violence and are seeking asylum—in the name of migration 
control. Consequently, state policies, priorities, and (in)action are 
animated by the “securitization” of migration.10 
A key element to a securitized migration policy is carceral 
migration control, including detention. During the most recent 
heightened migration flow to the EU, some states have attempted to 
cover up carceral responses in a cloak of crisis by denying the practice 
is even detention at all. Hungary, for example, has claimed that the 
punitive, fenced-in facilities in which it is holding migrants are not 
detention facilities, but rather “transit zones” that migrants have the 
freedom to leave for neighboring Serbia.11 In Italy, the trope of crisis 
has been evoked to promote mass deportations. 12  More recently, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who previously was the voice of 
accommodating involuntary migrants, agreed under political pressure 
to build “border camps” for asylum seekers.13 The example in Germany 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 113–116.
10. In this context, the term “securitization” refers to responding to migration
as a national security issue. See Jef Huysmans, The European Union and the 
Securitization of Migration, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 751, 758, 762 (Dec. 2000) 
(arguing that the securitization of migration in the EU developed through themes 
including internal security and “cultural security”). There is even a sub-topic in 
International Relations called “critical security studies.” See Christopher S. 
Browning & Matt McDonald, The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and 
the Politics of Security, 19 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 235, 236 (2011) (discussing one of the 
central themes of critical security studies as “the recognition that security is 
socially constructed and politically powerful.”). 
11. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REPORT TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 
VISIT TO HUNGARY CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPE COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION 
OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 23 (2018), 
https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/09/Hungary-CPT-report-Sept-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/74EU-8NYZ]. 
12. See Alex Green, Former Italian PM Berlusconi Calls Immigration a ‘Social
Bomb Ready to Explode in Italy’ as he Pledges to Deport 600,000 Illegal Migrants if 
he’s Re-elected, DAILY MAIL, (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-5353441/Berlusconi-deport-600K-illegal-migrants-elected.html [https:// 
perma.cc/74EU-8NYZ]. 
13. See Katrin Bennhold & Melissa Eddy, Merkel, to Survive, Agrees to
Border Camps for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/07/02/world/europe/angela-merkel-migration-coalition.html [https://perma.cc/ 
-3KWB-U2L9] (on file with Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
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is indicative of how European states continue to resort to punitive 
migration control measures in the face of a “crisis,” despite the fact that 
actual migration into the region has declined.14 
Using crisis to curtail rights, in particular the rights of 
migrants, of course is not new. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 is a stark example of crisis discourse in 
the United States, as well as states in Europe, making largely 
acceptable exceptional measures to monitor and vet those widely 
defined as “others.”15 Worldwide, this compulsion to treat individuals 
as “others” is reinforced and enhanced in the wake of events labeled as 
terrorist attacks.16 This Article examines the making of a potentially 
manufactured, or at least avoidable, crisis. It surveys the use of crisis 
discourse in Europe, particularly in justifying heightened detention 
14. The numbers of people risking the journey across the Mediterranean Sea
peaked in 2015 and have fallen sharply in each subsequent year. See Migration to 
Europe in charts supra note 7. According to Human Rights Watch, “[j]ust over 
172,300 people reached Europe by sea in 2017, less than half those in 2016.” 
Europe’s Migration Crisis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/tag/ 
europes-migration-crisis [https://perma.cc/M8US-2WBA]. The statistics provided 
by the International Organization for Migration for the first half of 2018 show that 
46,449 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea. See Tom Miles, U.N. View on 
the European Migrant Crisis? There Isn’t One, REUTERS (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-un/u-n-view-on-the-european-
migrant-crisis-there-isnt-one-idUSKBN1JW1Z5 [https://perma.cc/5ZNQ-LAN2]. 
15. See, e.g., Deepa Iyer & Jayesh M. Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation
of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, HUM. RTS., Winter 2011, at 10 (“The responses 
by the [U.S.] federal government to 9/11 have led to an unprecedented increase in 
detentions and deportations and unease and confusion within immigrant 
communities.”); Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Post-9/11 Policies 
Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 
(Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/post-911-policies-dramatic 
ally-alter-us-immigration-landscape [https://perma.cc/VV9A-ZL2X] (stating that 
since 9/11, immigration has been seen in the U.S. “through the lens of national 
security . . . giv[ing] rise to major new border security and law enforcement 
initiatives, heightened visa controls and screening of international travelers and 
would-be immigrants.”). In the European context, the region’s predominant post-
9/11 response has been in the form of “soft” security measures, including the 
creation of the European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac) in 2003. Michael Levi & David S. 
Wall, Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-9/11 European Information 
Society, 31 J. L. & SOC’Y 194, 199–202 (2004) (describing Eurodac as “a Europe-wide 
fingerprint identification system to track asylum seekers and illegal immigrants in 
[the then-] fourteen EU member states.”). 
16. See john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, The Problem of Othering:
Towards Inclusiveness and Belonging, OTHERING & BELONGING, Summer 2016, at 
16–17 (describing the phenomenon of “othering” following terrorist attacks). 
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practices, while acknowledging similarities as to the impact of crisis 
language on current migration policies in the United States.17 
Part I examines modern-day migration trends, and how 
government responses globally have tended toward securitization, 
with migrant detention as a central feature. It will describe how this 
shifts the framework of migration to crisis, which in turn shifts the 
movement of people across national borders from a human security 
issue—protecting people and providing assistance—to a national 
security issue. 18  The discussion turns to the justification used by 
states to treat migration as a security issue, namely what Professor 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales calls “migration emergencies.”19 It questions the 
authenticity of characterizing the European migration flow as 
unforeseen, and thus as requiring punitive and in some cases 
extraordinary responses. 
In Part II, the Article turns to an interrogation of how the 
European Union was slow to, and in some cases failed to, adopt policies 
in line with the concept of responsibility sharing to manage the 
heightened migration into the region. This analysis will include a brief 
discussion of the Dublin Regulation, an EU system that “denies 
refugees the right to choose the country in which they will seek 
asylum,”20 as an example of an EU policy choice that helped create the 
crisis. 
Part III starts with an examination of the original treatment 
of migrants’ rights in the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights (“Court”) 
on migrant detention. It then analyzes key Court judgments 
17. See Christopher Ingraham, There Is No Immigration Crisis, and These
Charts Prove It, WASH. POST (June 21, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/21/theres-no-immigration-crisis-and-these-charts-prove-it/ 
?utm_term=.f2331da8e39b (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) 
(highlighting data and research to dispel erroneous beliefs about immigration in 
the United States). The Trump Administration has reportedly said that a terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil could be politically beneficial. See Eric Levitz, The President 
Seems to Think a Second 9/11 Would Have Its Upsides, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 30, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/the-president-thinks-a-second-9-11-
would-have-its-upsides.html [https://perma.cc/RD7D-247U]. 
18. See Park, supra note 5.
19. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 609–
11 (2017) (presenting the media’s “migration emergencies” as a “legal construction 
of crisis”). 
20. James C. Hathaway, Harmonizing for Whom? The Devaluation of
Refugee Protection in the Era of European Economic Integration, 26 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 719, 731 (1993).
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concerning migrant detention during the latest wave of involuntary 
migration into the region. In doing so, the Article addresses the novel 
questions of whether and how the European human rights system’s, 
namely the Court’s, treatment of migrant detention exemplifies or 
supersedes limits on extending international human rights protections 
to migrants, particularly in the context of crisis. 
I. GREATER MIGRATION, GREATER DETENTION 
A. An Age of Migration 
In his book Exodus, economist Paul Collier explores the 
reasons underlying the rise in migration worldwide, placing the 
phenomenon in the following historical context: 
For a half century following the outbreak of the First 
World War countries closed their borders. Wars and 
the Depression made migration practically difficult 
and immigrants unwelcome. By the 1960s people 
overwhelmingly lived in the country in which they had 
been born. But during that half-century of immobility, 
there had been a dramatic change in the global 
economy; a gulf had opened up between the incomes of 
countries.21 
Collier explains the effect of this gulf on both countries sending 
migrants and countries receiving migrants: the prosperous countries 
needed workers, and citizens of poor countries needed work.22 
The resulting global migration is significant. In the last half-
century, the number of people crossing borders in search of new, 
temporary, or permanent places to live went up almost 200 percent.23 
In 1960, approximately seventy-two million people resided in a country 
that was not their place of birth; by 2010, this population grew to 213 
million.24 From an economic standpoint, the push factor to migrate is 
                                                                                                             
21. PAUL COLLIER, EXODUS: HOW MIGRATION IS CHANGING OUR WORLD 27 
(2015). 
22. Id. at 37. 
23. TOM K. WONG, RIGHTS, DEPORTATION, AND DETENTION IN THE AGE OF 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL 1 (2015) (citing data from the World Bank). 
24. Id. at 1–2. Professor Wong goes on to point out: “While international 
migration to high-income, Western countries has generally accounted for much of 
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not dissipating, but is, instead, growing: “for several decades the 
income gap will be wide enough to constitute a strong incentive to 
migration, and one that is actually increasing.”25 
This “age of migration”26 is, as political science professor Tom 
Wong articulates, part of the “dual reality that this is also an 
unrelenting age of immigration control.” 27  Professor Wong defines 
immigration control as “the policies and practices used to deter 
unwanted immigration, meaning immigration that is occurring despite 
and against the intentions of states.”28 Policies and practices of carceral 
migration control are critical to this trend. 
In Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, the frame of 
migration control has shifted the movement of people from a human 
security concern to a national security concern.29 The United States’ 
responses to the arrival of the “migrant caravan” of Central Americans 
represent such a shift, with the deployment of 5,600 American troops 
to the southwest border,30 and the use of tear gas on migrants at the 
                                                                                                             
the increase in the world’s migrant population, these countries are not alone in 
experiencing large-scale international migration.” Id. at 2. Wong points to several 
Middle Eastern countries as examples: in Jordan, 50% of the population is foreign-
born; in Qatar and Kuwait, approximately 75% of the population are migrants. Id. 
25. COLLIER, supra note 21, at 40. Collier also discusses the role of the 
diaspora in migration in what he calls the three “building blocks” of the dynamics 
of migration: “The first block is that migration depends upon the size of the 
diaspora . . . . The second is that migration adds to the diaspora, whereas absorption 
into mainstream society reduces it. The third is that the rate of absorption depends 
upon the size of the diaspora . . . .” Id. at 43. 
26. WONG, supra note 23, at 3 (citing STEPHEN CASTLES, HEIN DE HAAS & 
MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION 
MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (5th ed. 2013)). 
27. Id. Professor Wong describes this age of immigration control as “the 
expansion of the immigration-industrial complex—which includes multilateral 
deportation regimes, public-private partnerships between states and publicly 
traded prison firms, increasingly dense networks of immigration detention sites 
and asylum processing centers, external border controls, and interior immigration 
enforcement . . . .” Id. at 2. 
28. Id. at 9. 
29. See Park, supra note 5 (quoting Brookings Institution’s Senior Fellow 
Khalid Koser: “We used to think of migration as a human security issue: protecting 
people and providing assistance. . . . Now we clearly perceive—or misperceive—
migration as a national security issue. And the risk of securitizing migration is that 
you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses.”). 
30. Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Helene Cooper, Deployed Inside the United 
States: The Military Waits for the Migrant Caravan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/us/deployed-inside-the-united-states-the-
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San Diego-Tijuana border crossing.31 These are stark examples of how 
the imperative to protect people seeking refuge is supplanted by the 
priority to protect the nation state from a perceived threat. Principles 
governing the admission of foreign nationals into a state historically 
have implicated state sovereignty.32 The balance today globally tilts 
heavily toward state sovereignty concerns, and the resulting emphasis 
on security comes at the cost of protecting vulnerable individuals 
fleeing their home countries involuntarily, including due to human 
rights abuses. This is not the only way the global community can 
respond, or has responded, to mass migration. 
In a succinct reflection challenging the characterization of 
recent migration flows as a crisis, 33  former U.N. Deputy High 
Commissioner for Refugees and law professor Alexander Aleinikoff 
offered examples of how the United States has accommodated major 
refugee movements in the past. Professor Aleinikoff cites examples 
after World War II, Southeast Asian refugees fleeing conflicts in the 
1970s and 1980s, tens of thousands of Bosnians displaced by the 
Balkan War in the 1990s, and one million Cubans escaping an 
authoritarian government over half a dozen decades. 34  European 
states, similarly, have responded to periods of mass migration on 
                                                                                                             
military-waits-for-the-migrant-caravan.html (on file with the Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review). 
31. Colleen Long & Elliot Spagat, Trump Strongly Defends Use of Tear Gas 
on Caravan Migrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www. 
apnews.com/b084172b06b64badbded4d0061a1edbc [https://perma.cc/UPS9-YT4Q]. 
32. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 19, at 625 (quoting Professor Catherine 
Dauvergne to characterize migration law as the “last bastion of sovereignty.”); 
WONG, supra note 23, at 1 (characterizing migration as an issue that encompasses 
“how the movement of people across borders collides with the foundational 
principles of national security, sovereignty, and citizenship . . . .”). 
33. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Reflections on the Worldwide Refugee “Crisis,” 
21 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 9 (2017) (“If there is a ‘crisis,’ it’s not a crisis 
in our broken borders, or rich countries that are at risk. I think it is a crisis of faith, 
a crisis of morality.”). This Article similarly argues that the European migration 
“crisis” is not one of numbers but of the EU migration system. See infra Part II.B. 
34. Id. at 2–3. Professor Aleinikoff characterizes the United States’ response 
to the Vietnamese boat flow of the 1980s via the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(“CPA”) as among the most significant examples of international responsibility 
sharing. Id. at 6–7. 
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multiple occasions since the Second World War,35 and their responses 
were often more accommodating than defensive.36 
Overwhelmingly, however, state responses to present-day 
migration patterns fall more in line with that of an age of immigration 
control. In fact, as Wong points out, “in some countries, more people 
have been apprehended, detained, and deported in the modern era 
of migration than have actually immigrated.” 37  Today’s persistent 
characterization of the movement of people across borders as 
unpredictable crises justifies, often to the extent of necessitating, a 
securitization response to migration. 
B. Crisis Discourse 
The word “crisis” had a particular meaning in Ancient Greek 
law: “[D]erived from the Greek verb kríno, [its] meanings include to 
decide, to quarrel, to judge . . . . In law, it meant arriving at a verdict 
or judgment . . . [indicating] that ‘crisis’ was a central concept by which 
justice and the political order . . . could be harmonised through 
appropriate legal decisions.” 38  This conceived-of role for crisis as 
interweaving justice and political order presupposes the question: 
justice and order for whom? In a related question, is the harmonization 
geared at maintaining the status quo or adjusting political and legal 
                                                                                                             
35. See Simas Grigonis, EU in the Face of Migrant Crisis: Reasons for 
Ineffective Human Rights Protection, 2 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 93, 93 (2016) (referring 
to the mass migration of 60 million refugees during and after WWII, the fall of the 
Soviet Union causing 700,000 asylum seekers, and more recently, 2.6 million 
Ukrainians fleeing the war started by Russia- supported separatists). 
36. See James Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the 
Response of the International Community, 3 MICH. J. INT’L L. 3, 5–7 (1982) 
(describing the assistance and resettlement efforts by temporary United Nations 
agency, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in operation from 1946-1952, 
and the support the IRO received from the United States and European nations). 
37. WONG, supra note 23, at 11 (using the United States as an example: 
“[W]hereas nearly 40 million people were admitted into the United States from 
1927 to 2010, some 52 million were deported or returned.”). 
38. Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, The Crisis and the Quotidian 
in International Human Rights Law, in CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: DECOY 
OR CATALYST?, 44 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 21 (Mielle K. Bulterman & Willem J.M. van 
Genugten eds., 2013). See also Jamie R. Abrams, The #MeToo Movement: An 
Invitation for Feminist Critique of Rape Crisis Framing, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 749, 
764–65 (2018) (discussing dictionary and other ancient language definitions of 
crisis). 
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systems to account for changes percolating due to the crisis event? The 
discussion that follows will weigh in on these questions. 
The key to crisis discourse is how it shapes a state’s response. 
The characterization of crisis can create an urgency to act, serving as 
a “catalyst.”39 In fact, much of international human rights law has been 
enacted in response to crises, primarily in response to past atrocities 
or in the aftermath of wars.40 Calling a phenomenon a crisis can also 
deflect change, serving instead as a “decoy.” 41  For example, the 
arrival of hundreds of Fujianese migrants to Canada in 1999 was 
characterized by crisis discourse, when in fact the backlashed to their 
migration stemmed from the socio-economic success of people of 
Chinese descent and the way this was perceived to be altering 
Canada’s identity.42 The U.S. government’s response in post-Hurricane 
Katrina New Orleans provides several examples of how the cover of a 
crisis can render acceptable the failure to act adequately. 43  Crisis 
discourse could also create the opportunity for policymakers to ignore 
long-term solutions, which tend also to be rights-based solutions, and 
instead opt for ad hoc responses.44 
                                                                                                             
39. Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 22. 
40. Dianne Otto, Remapping Crisis Through a Feminist Lens, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE 
AND COMPLIANCE? 81–82 (Sari Kouvo & Zoe Pearson, eds., 2011); Authers & 
Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 25 (providing the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as examples of reactionary human 
rights law). Other international human rights instruments utilize the language of 
crisis, albeit in the context of scale of harm. Id. at 27–28 (providing as examples the 
Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in contrast 
to the “more bland and bureaucratic than crisis-driven flavour” of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)). 
41. Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 22. 
42. Sean P. Hier & Joshua L. Greenberg, Constructing a Discursive Crisis: 
Risk, Problematization and Illegal Chinese in Canada, 25 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD., 
490, 498–509 (2002). 
43. Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 22 (detailing examples of the 
inadequate government response in post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans). 
44. Professor Abrams, for example, writes about how the rape “crisis” 
affected statutory reforms of rape laws in the United States. Abrams, supra note 
38, at 769. 
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Historians and political philosophers have been contending 
with the concept of crisis since the mid-twentieth century.45 Hannah 
Arendt, one of the first political thinkers to raise the serious questions 
associated with the plight of refugees, 46  wrote in 1958 that “[t]he 
general crisis that has overtaken the modern world everywhere and in 
almost every sphere of life manifests itself differently in each country, 
involving different areas and taking on different forms.”47 
Arendt’s depiction of ubiquitous global crises half a century ago 
resonates strongly with how a spectrum of socio-political issues are 
driven by crisis discourse today. For example, as Professor Dianne Otto 
details, the condition “more or less permanently suspended in states of 
crises” describes a spectrum of everyday issues, including food security 
and climate change.48 The unremarkable and ubiquitous nature of the 
term “crisis” today raises questions about the functionality of the 
designation. In the context of migration, the moniker of crisis has a 
significant effect on the identity imposed on involuntary migrants, 
which then fosters public and institutional tolerance for emergency-
driven responses. 
1. Migration Crises, Threatening Migrants 
As demonstrated by the pervasiveness of crises today, there is 
significant flexibility in how a crisis is construed or constructed. 49 
Determining which events culminate into a crisis is tied to the fact that 
crisis is a signifier largely derived from a social construct.50 Cultural 
                                                                                                             
45. Lin Chalozin-Dovrat, “Crisis” in Modernity: A Sign of the Times Between 
Decisive Change and Potential Irreversibility, in DISCOURSE AND CRISIS 67 (Antoon 
De Rycker & Zuraidah Mohd Don eds., 2013). For a history of the evolution of the 
concept of crisis in Western European political thought, see id. at 70–86. 
46. See Richard J. Bernstein, The Illuminations of Hannah Arendt, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/why-read-
hannah-arendt-now.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
47. Chalozin-Dovrat, supra note 45, at 67. 
48. Otto, supra note 40, at 75–77 (arguing that ubiquitous crises 
characterizations is reshaping how the international community approaches peace 
and security, and that “crises everywhere are . . . particularly dangerous . . . for 
feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of thinking.”). 
49. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 19, at 618. See also Authers & Charlesworth, 
supra note 38, at 23 (stating that “‘[c]risis’ is malleable and ambiguous, a generic 
term for a type of transition.”). 
50. See Antoon De Rycker & Zuraidah Mohd Don, Discourse in Crisis, Crisis 
in Discourse, in DISCOURSE AND CRISIS 3 (2013) (“Crisis events influenced by, what 
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resonance, often manifested in socio-political views of an influential or 
actual majority, is an important indicator of what events or phenomena 
are labeled a crisis, and how this designation plays out.51 For example, 
cultural disagreement has been elevated to a crisis in the same-sex 
marriage context as countries around the globe claim that same-sex 
marriage threatens calamity on different-sex marriages, children, and 
society at large.52 In the context of migration, socio-political views of 
groups based on their race, ethnicity, nationality, and/or religion have 
been explicitly used to construct a migration crisis in the United States 
and Europe.53 
                                                                                                             
is said or written: these texts in their turn will lead to new texts, even new genres, 
which will then co-create new discourses or reinforce/subvert existing ones . . . .”). 
51. See Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 22 (“The success or failure 
of a reaction is dependent on the way the story of the event is told: ‘the identification 
of a crisis always projects a possible response, and requires narratives of these 
responses to resonate culturally.’”). 
52. See, e.g., Ben Westcott & Angus Watson, ‘A Great Divide’: Inside the 
Battle to Stop Same-Sex Marriage in Taiwan, CNN (Nov. 24, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/23/asia/taiwan-gay-marriage-china-intl/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XRL-TEYY?type=image] (quoting opposition to same-sex 
marriage legalization as stating: “If Taiwan passes marriage equality, HIV-positive 
people will come to Taiwan and flood our health system.”); Dana Alexandra Scherle, 
Romania Votes on Same-Sex Marriage with Government in Crisis, MSN NEWS 
(Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/romania-votes-on-same-sex-
marriage-with-government-in-crisis/ar-BBNVJXB [https://perma.cc/EKV3-XVNE 
?type=image] (citing arguments against same-sex marriage to include 
“threaten[ing] society as a whole” and “claim[ing] gay people want to ‘take away’ 
other people’s children.”); Will Woodward, Chloe Watson & Nick Evershed, 
Homophobia Hits Home: Readers Expose Ugly Side of Same-Sex Marriage 
Campaign, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
australia-news/2017/sep/13/homophobia-hits-home-readers-expose-ugly-side-of-
same-sex-marriage-campaign [https://perma.cc/2DT8-362F] (referencing anti-
same-sex marriage advocates in Australia’s leaflets claiming “our children and 
their children will be brainwashed by homosexual organizations.”). 
53. See Anthony Faiola, New Far-Right Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Hits 
German Streets, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/europe/new-far-right-anti-immigrant-sentiment-hits-german-streets/20 
15/01/23/dd23ec5c-a282-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html?utm_term=.def97c3b 
aba6 [https://perma.cc/85XJ-KP8Q] (on file with Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review) (quoting a German anti-immigrant protester in Dresden who claimed that 
“[t]his is not about racism but about control . . . . They come here, wanting to force 
their mentalities on Germans. All these women in veils. We need a new 
immigration law.”). Protests in Bratislava, Slovakia, “organized by an extremist 
outfit . . . ended with more than 100 arrests on Saturday.” Andrew Higgins, Fissures 
in E.U. Deepen From Strain of Migrant Influx and Greek Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/fissures-in-eu-
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Culture in the form of political will can override what arguably 
should be inherent in the meaning of crisis, namely that it is an event 
that is temporally bound. Specifically, while the term in its most 
genuine sense should describe an event that was unforeseeable and 
unique, a crisis has come to describe occurrences that “can be 
exceptional, predictable, repetitive, and possibly even perpetual.” 54 
The crisis discourse accompanying the movement of people across 
nation state borders, given that the phenomenon is ongoing and shows 
no signs of slowing,55 is an example of an omnipresent and potentially 
perpetual crisis.56 
Returning to the Ancient Greek definitional function of crisis, 
the designation as it has played out in the context of migration largely 
                                                                                                             
deepen-from-strain-of-migrant-influx-and-greek-debt.html [https://perma.cc/29LY-
97MR] (on file with Columbia Human Rights Law Review). The arrests occurred 
“just two days after the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party, once dismissed as 
an assembly of marginal cranks, won more than 20 percent of the vote in 
parliamentary elections in Denmark.” Id. During the recent heightened wave of 
involuntary migrants to Europe, elected officials in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia declared admission preferences for Christian (i.e. not Muslim) 
refugees. Jürgen Bast & Liav Orgad, Constitutional Identities in the Age of Globe 
Migration, 18 GERMAN L.J. 1587, 1590 (2017). See also Dana Milbank, To Uphold 
Trump’s Travel Ban, Justices Have to Ignore his “Animus,” WASH. POST. (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-makes-the-muslim-ban-a-
muslim-ban-trump/2018/04/25/0ae1c3c0-48d0-11e8-8b5a-3b1697adcc2a_story.htm 
l?utm_term=.ac210bc5fcd9 [https://perma.cc/WQ9P-YLV5] (on file with Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review) (describing President Trump’s false claims about 
Muslim immigrants in the United States); Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times 
Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4473972/ 
donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/ [https://perma.cc/A2Z5-YHFP] (discussing 
Mexican immigrants as “bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”); 
see generally Abdeslam Marfouk, I’m Neither Racist Nor Xenophobic, but: 
Dissecting European Attitudes Towards a Ban on Muslims’ Immigration, 12 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1 (2018) (providing “evidence that racism and immigration 
phobia play a key role in shaping Europeans’ support of a ban on Muslims’ 
immigration.”). 
54. Id.; see also Chalozin-Dovrat, supra note 45, at 86 (“Five semantic 
clusters . . . are still active in contemporary uses of the term [crisis]: decisive change, 
evenementiality (i.e., the sense of event), abnormality, inevitability and potential 
irreversibility.”). 
55. See Vincent Chetail, The Human Rights of Migrants in General 
International Law: From Minimum Standards to Fundamental Rights, 28 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 225, 225 (2013) (stating that “[m]igration is a permanent feature of 
history” and “[t]here is nothing surprising in this”). 
56. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 19, at 609 (questioning whether migrant flows 
characterized as emergencies are actually “unexpected and unpredictable.”). 
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has served to maintain order for the citizens of receiving states, at the 
expense of ensuring protection for involuntary migrants. As such, the 
label of a migration crisis has been used to maintain the status quo, 
further normalizing migration predominantly as a security concern 
instead of responding to migration by adjusting to a new normal. 
In Europe and elsewhere, migration perceived as a security 
threat normalizes extraordinary, punitive state responses to the 
movement of people across borders.57  This process of securitization 
shifts the identity of involuntary migrants from individuals in need of 
protection to a generalized group of threatening newcomers.58 As a 
starting point, receiving states typically view migrants as monolithic, 
essentialized culturally and thereby occupying a space of “the other.”59 
Perceiving migrants through the security lens as individuals from 
whom inhabitants of the receiving state need protection makes 
migrants what Professor Viet Thanh Nguyen calls “hypervisible.”60 
                                                                                                             
57. Utilizing the concept of crisis for other objectives is a subject of analysis 
in areas outside of migration control. See, e.g., David Landau, Populist 
Constitutions, 88 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (2018) (“The constitution-making 
moment allows populist leaders to give a dramatic response to [an] environment of 
crisis.”); NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 
(2007) (defining “shock doctrine” as governments and corporations capitalizing on 
actual or perceived crises). Additionally, some have suggested a tension in 
conceptualizing securitization between disciplines. See, e.g., Vicki Squire, The 
Securitisation of Migration: An Absent Presence?, in THE SECURITISATION OF 
MIGRATION IN THE EU 19, 20 (2015) (“[D]ivergent responses to the question of 
whether or not migration is securitised not only reflects divergent 
conceptualizations of securitisation, but also the entrenchment of a disciplinary 
divide between scholars of migration studies and scholars of critical security 
studies.”). 
58. Roger Zetter, Creating Identities, Diminishing Protection and the 
Securitisation of Asylum in Europe, in REFUGEE PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF 
LAW: CONFLICTING IDENTITIES 22, 26 (Susan Kneebone, Dallal Stevens & Loretta 
Baldassar, eds., 2014) (“[T]he ‘Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy’ . . . ha[s] 
substantially reinforced the negative identity of refugees seeking asylum in the EU 
and diminished the scope and quality of protection . . . .”). 
59. Leti Volpp has written foundational articles on these concepts. See Leti 
Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (2001); 
Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture:” Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1996). 
60. VIET THANH NGUYEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE DISPLACED: REFUGEE 
WRITERS ON REFUGEE LIVES 15 (Viet Thanh Nguyen, ed., 2018) (“Invisible and 
hypervisible, refugees are ignored and forgotten by those who are not refugees until 
they turn into a menace. Refugees, like all others, are unseen until they are seen 
everywhere, threatening to overwhelm our borders, invade our cultures, rape our 
women, threaten our children, destroy our economies.”). 
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When migration is framed as a threatening crisis, it also sparks a 
restrictive articulation of what is a state’s collective identity, thereby 
imposing 
an “us” versus “them” discourse.61 As discussed in the next section, 
securitizing migration in Europe in the name of protecting a perceived 
collective identity has cast involuntary migrants increasingly as 
incorrigibly irregular.62 
C. An Age of Detention 
The detention of involuntary migrants, and non-citizens 
generally, is a practice increasingly used by states around the world. 
A migrant can be detained during one or more periods: upon her 
arrival seeking entry into the state, during the adjudication of her 
immigration case (including for asylum),63 and in furtherance of her 
removal from a country. 
The rise of migrant detention in the United States is a striking 
example of the escalated use of carceral migration control. The 
government in the not so distant past rarely detained migrants, but 
today detention in the United States is virtually “commonplace.”64 This 
includes a shift in detaining migrants without specific cause—there 
was a 146 percent increase in apprehension of immigrants without 
criminal convictions at the border in 2017.65 
                                                                                                             
61. Bast & Orgad, supra note 53, at 1590 (“Immigration policy echoes 
national identity by mirroring not only the qualities that ‘we’ value in others, but 
also the essentials that define ‘us’ as a nation.”). 
62. See Leti Volpp, Refugees Welcome?, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 71, 91–94 
(2017) (“[A]n asylum application is one of the few ways to enter a European country. 
There is thus an analogy between the U.S. ‘illegal immigrant’ and the European 
refugee . . . .”). 
63. The practice of detaining asylum seekers is one increasingly used 
worldwide. In the United States, for example, legislative changes passed in 1996 
made the detention of asylum seekers mandatory. The automatic detention of 
asylum seekers is arguably against international law. See WONG, supra note 23, at 
45–48 (arguing that mandatory detention amounts to arbitrary detention in 
violation of several international human rights and customary law). 
64. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc 
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 182 (2012). 
65. Amanda Holpuch, Families Divided at the Border: ‘The Most Horrific 
Immigration Policy I’ve Ever Seen, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/19/families-border-separations-
trump-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/9C5C-AAER]. 
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As a result, the United States immigration system held an 
average of over 42,000 people in custody each day through 2018.66 
Additionally, in the summer of 2018, President Trump’s “no tolerance” 
policy for unauthorized border crossings led to family separation, 
including separately detaining over 1,600 children from their 
parents.67 This policy change fueled what has been an ongoing trend of 
privatizing migrant detention—over 60 percent of the migrant 
detention facilities in the United States, including these recent “family 
detention” centers, are owned and operated by for-profit corporations.68 
In Europe, the United Kingdom has one of the largest 
immigrant detention systems, 69  and, as Part II.C. details, migrant 
detention across Europe is on the rise. The United Kingdom, along with 
the United States and Australia—the other industrial countries with 
relatively long histories of  carceral migration control practices—do not 
have statutory limits on the length of migrant detention.70 
While immigration detention has garnered increased scrutiny 
from the international human rights community,71 there is general 
acceptance that detention is an appropriate adjunct to migration 
control. 72  This acquiescence exists despite the fact that significant 
                                                                                                             
66. Geneva Sands, This Year Saw the Most People in Immigration Detention 
Since 2001, CNN (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/12/politics/ice-
detention/index.html [https://perma.cc/TM3V-2XMS]. 
67. Holpuch, supra note 65. 
68. Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www. 
freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/XVX4-RECY]. 
69. See Jamie Grierson, Immigration Detention: How the UK Compares with 
Other Countries, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian. 
com/uk-news/2018/oct/10/immigration-detention-how-the-uk-compares-with-other-
countries [https://perma.cc/LQU8-VHKG]; Niamh McIntyre & Diane Taylor, 
Britain’s Immigration Detention: How Many People are Locked Up?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/11/britains-
immigration-detention-how-many-people-are-locked-up [https://perma.cc/4S72-
69VL]. 
70. Grierson, supra note 69. 
71. See Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: 
Immigration Detention Under International Human Rights and the EU Law, 19 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257, 272 (2012) [hereinafter Human Rights and the 
Elusive Universal Subject]. 
72. DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 
169 (2011) (“[L]engthy purely administrative detention of non-dangerous migrants 
and asylum seekers has become very common in Europe); Sklansky, supra note 64, 
at 182 (describing the practice of detaining immigrants as “commonplace” in the 
United States). 
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human rights interests are at stake, including the deprivation of 
liberty, restrictions on freedom of movement, and possible violations 
of the prohibition of torture or degrading or inhumane conditions.73 
By characterizing migration as a crisis, states have legitimized 
and normalized detaining involuntary migrants for administrative 
reasons alone,74 illustrating how “detention is symbolic of the crisis 
narrative.”75 
II. THE EU MIGRATION RESPONSE 
The fact that crisis discourse has shaped the perception of 
recent migration into Europe is not only indicative of a global trend 
and growing nationalism in the region, but also of the repercussions of 
EU policy-making. The region’s migration policies, particularly in 
relation to asylum seekers, have failed to provide uniformity 76  or 
establish systems for shared responsibility77 amongst member states. 
Instead, European migration has generated increasingly punitive 
responses, including detention, a result more representative of a crisis 
of the region’s policies than the magnitude of migration. 
                                                                                                             
73. See Grigonis, supra note 35, at 95 (adding the right to family life, and 
access to justice, education, and employment as significant human rights interests). 
74. Human rights guidelines and instruments have explicitly criticized the 
use of detention for administrative purposes only. See, e.g., U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES (UNHCR), DETENTION GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICABLE 
CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, at GUIDELINE 4.1.4 ¶ 32 (2012), https://www. 
refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review) (“[D]etention is not permitted as a punitive . . . measure or a 
disciplinary sanction for irregular entry or presence in the country.”); Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 31, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
(prohibiting States from imposing penalties on refugees “on account of their illegal 
entry or presence.”). 
75. Cetta Mainwaring, Constructing a Crisis: The Role of Immigration 
Detention in Malta, 18 POPULATION, SPACE & PLACE 687, 687 (2012) (examining 
the role of Malta’s mandatory detention policy for irregular migrants in the early 
2000s). 
76. See infra text accompanying note 126–129 (noting the lack of uniformity 
in EU asylum procedures despite the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)). 
77. For an examination of the concept of shared responsibility to protect 
refugees generally, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the 
Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 690 (2015) (“Despite the 
gravity of the refugee crisis, states can manage it if they cooperate to share the cost 
and responsibility of protecting [Syrian] refugees.”) (emphasis in original). 
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A. The Modern EU Migration System 
The European Union’s history of migration policy tracks 
Collier’s trajectory of starting with a need for workers.78 The founding 
treaty, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, of what was then called the European 
Economic Community (EEC), established a migration policy that 
provided for the freedom of movement for foreign workers.79  Early 
migration policies consisted of bilateral agreements between states 
based on labor needs, and were not concerned with harmonizing 
migration policies more broadly.80 
The region’s desire for work-based immigration changed after 
the 1970s oil crisis, when, despite a recession and growing 
unemployment, foreign workers not only remained in the EEC but 
were also beginning to bring over family members.81 In response, the 
Council of Europe (“Council”) encouraged the drafting of common 
legislation pertaining to immigration.82 Some member states opposed 
the Council’s effort as an infringement on national sovereignty, and so 
                                                                                                             
78. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
79. Marco Martiniello, The New Migratory Europe: Towards a Proactive 
Immigration Policy?, in IMMIGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 298, 
313–14 (Craig A. Parsons & Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 2006); Hathaway, supra 
note 20, at 722 (noting that freedom of movement provisions for workers were 
extended to all EEC citizens in the 1986 Single European Act). 
80. Martiniello, supra note 79, at 311; see also Huysmans, supra note 10, at 
753 (“[I]n the 1950s and 1960s immigrants were primarily an extra workforce in 
most western European countries. . . . Countries like France, Germany and the 
Netherlands used a permissive or even promotional migration policy motivated by 
the need for extra labour.”). 
81. Martiniello, supra note 79, at 303–04. See also Saara Koikkalainen, Free 
Movement in Europe: Past and Present, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 21, 2011), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present 
[https://perma.cc/EQT8-STX3] (“To the surprise of the host nations, however, most 
of the guest workers had come to stay. Moreover, many of these migrants had 
invited their families to join them in the destination countries . . . .); Bob Hepple, 
The Crisis in EEC Labour Law, 16 INDUS. L.J. 77, 79, 80–81 (1987) (“The 
unemployment rate in the EEC grew from 3 percent in 1973 to 4.5 percent in 1975 
and 6 percent in 1980. . . . [T]o 11.8 per cent in January 1987 . . . .”). 
82. Hathaway, supra note 20, at 729 (noting that the Council issued 
“resolutions in 1976 and 1981 calling for procedural and substantive harmonization 
of refugee law”). 
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in 1985 the Council adopted a resolution leaving non-European 
migration policy as an issue for individual states to legislate.83 
During this time, there was a regional appetite to forge 
cooperation with respect to asylum procedures.84  The first attempt 
at this was the 1985 Schengen Agreement, which sought to eliminate 
internal border controls and harmonize the external border control 
laws of participating states.85 Another effort toward regional asylum 
procedures was the 1990 Dublin Convention, 86  which initiated a 
system to determine which member state is responsible for processing 
asylum claims. 87  Significantly, the resulting Dublin Regulation 
designates the EU member state where asylum seekers first enter as 
the state responsible for processing their applications.88 Its motivation, 
as the name indicates, is regulatory, including preventing asylum 
                                                                                                             
83. Martiniello, supra note 79, at 314–15; see also Hathaway, supra note 20, 
at 729–30 (noting that Europe’s two supranational authorities were effectively 
excluded from further development of a common asylum law). 
84. Cathryn Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation 
of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of 
International Protection?, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 35, 37 (2005) [hereinafter 
Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive]. 
85. For a summary of the historical context leading up to the Schengen 
Agreement, see Sean M. Topping, Note, Defying Schengen Through Internal Border 
Controls: Acts of National Risk-Taking or Violations of International Law at the 
Heart of Europe?, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 331, 334–36 (2016); see also Hathaway, supra 
note 20, at 724 (pointing out that Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were required 
to enact stringent visa and other external border controls before being permitted 
into the Schengen Border Agreement.). 
86. For a summary of the development of the Dublin Regulation, including 
of the 1990 Convention, see SUSAN FRATZKE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., NOT ADDING 
UP: THE FADING PROMISE OF EUROPE’S DUBLIN SYSTEM 3–4 (2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPIe-Asylum-
DublinReg.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS9B-9LNJ]. For the latest version of the Dublin 
Regulation, see Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) (EU). 
87. Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive, supra note 84 at 41; 
Martiniello, supra note 79, at 318 (“To avoid the ‘orbiting refugee’ phenomenon, [the 
Dublin Convention] lays down that one Member State alone shall be in charge of 
screening each asylum application.”). 
88. See Mainwaring, supra note 75, at 695 (“Under the [Dublin] Regulation, 
all irregular migrants are fingerprinted when they arrive in an EU member state. 
These fingerprints are held as part of the Eurodac, a European database containing 
the fingerprints of all asylum seekers and migrants who cross borders irregularly.”). 
Recent exceptions have been made for family reunification requests. See Catherine 
Tinker, Saving Lives and Building Society: The European Migration Agenda, 22 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 400 (2016). 
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“shopping,” 89  wherein migrants may seek to benefit from the 
substantial differences amongst EU states in rates of asylum grants.90 
Thus, the Regulation’s objective has not been to facilitate capacity 
sharing among Dublin states, but instead to serve as an apparatus to 
make asylum determinations, 91  a distinction that, as discussed 
previously in Part I.B.1, has contributed significantly to the region’s 
migration crisis. 
At the turn of the century, member states attempted a uniform 
asylum process “after concluding that a common asylum and migration 
policy was fundamental to the goal of transforming the EU into an area 
of freedom, security, and justice.” 92  The result was the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS),93 whose infrastructure was created 
between 2000 and 2005, and prompted a second iteration of the Dublin 
Regulation (“Dublin II”).94 The recently intensified wave of involuntary 
migration to the region put to the test core components of EU migration 
policy, including the Schengen Agreement, the CEAS, and Dublin. 
                                                                                                             
89. FRATZKE, supra note 86, at 1. 
90. For example, in 2016, the chance of an asylum applicant from 
Afghanistan being recognized as a refugee was 1.7% in Bulgaria, but 97.0% in Italy. 
HANNE BEIRENS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., CRACKED FOUNDATION, UNCERTAIN 
FUTURE: STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 
4, 17 (2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/structural-weaknesses-
common-european-asylum-system [https://perma.cc/B68J-CMBG]. 
91. FRATZKE, supra note 86, at 4 (describing Dublin II as the first part of 
CEAS “aimed simply to establish a mechanism swiftly to determine the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application.”). 
92. Maryellen Fullerton, Refugees and the Primacy of European Human 
Rights Law, 21 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFF. 45, 52 (2017). 
93. For a general background on the CEAS, see Elspeth Guild, Conflicting 
Identities and Securitisation in Refugee Law: Lessons from the EU 151–53, in 
REFUGEE PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF LAW (Susan Kneebone et al. eds., 2014); 
see generally OLGA FERGUSON SIDORENKO, THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM 
SYSTEM: BACKGROUND, CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS, FUTURE DIRECTION (2007) 
(analyzing and evaluating the CEAS). 
94. The first piece of CEAS legislation enacted was the 2000 EURODAC 
Regulation, which created a centralized biometrics system for asylum seekers. 
Fullerton, supra note 92, at 52. In addition to the Dublin Regulation, the EU 
enacted in 2003 the Reception Conditions Directive, which set standards for shelter 
and services for asylum seekers. Id. at 52–53. Following the Qualification Directive, 
which created two groups of asylum grants, the last piece of CEAS legislation was 
the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive, which set out mandated adjudication 
procedures such as individual interviews and government-provided interpreters. 
Id. at 53–54. 
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B. Recent Migration in Europe 
The wave of intensified migration into the European region 
began in 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings.95 In 2013, 
involuntary migrants lodged approximately 435,385 asylum claims in 
the EU;96 in 2014, that number rose to around 600,000.97 By 2014, 
Europeans were engaged in an extensive dialogue about migration,98 
and by 2015 the region’s response to involuntary migrants was 
described as “abysmal.”99 
Globally, 2015 marked an unprecedented year for migration. 
According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), there were 65.3 million involuntary migrants.100 That year, 
approximately 1.3 million migrants sought entry into Europe, 101 
predominately from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.102 
The severity of the danger associated with the journey across 
the Mediterranean Sea was captured in images and numbers,103 and 
                                                                                                             
95. Id. 
96. European Comm’n Press Release MEMO/15/4544, Towards a 
Comprehensive European Migration Policy: 20 years of EU Action (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4544_en.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
R7UH-X7CX]. 
97. Id. 
98. Stefano M. Torelli, Migration Through the Mediterranean: Mapping the 
EU Response, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (2017), https://www.ecfr.eu/ 
specials/mapping_migration [https://perma.cc/7XK9-8HHE]. 
99. Matteo Garavoglia, Why Europe Can’t Handle the Migration Crisis, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2015/10/05/why-europe-cant-handle-the-migration-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8HGA-RKM3]. 
100. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, at 2 (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/ 
576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html [https://perma.cc/3CRW-B7BY]. 
101. Fullerton, supra note 92, at 47–48. 
102. Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 
Million in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/ 
02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm_2016-
08-02_europe-asylum-04/ [https://perma.cc/E3CT-W9C6]. 
103. See, e.g., Jane Onyanga-Omaya, Migrant Deaths in Mediterranean Hit 
a Record in 2015, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2015, 5:35 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/12/31/record-migrant-refugee-
deaths-mediterranean/78124496/ [https://perma.cc/MQT5-N7HQ] (“The death toll 
of refugees and other migrants making the perilous journey across the 
Mediterranean Sea in 2015 rose to a record 3,771. . . . April was the deadliest month 
for migrant deaths on the Mediterranean in 2015. Nearly 1,250 died, including an 
estimated 800 in a single incident when a vessel capsized off the Libyan coast.”); 
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was exacerbated by both the conditions of migrants’ vessels104 and, in 
some cases, receiving countries’ hostile reception of the migrants.105 
External EU border states such as Greece and Italy in particular 
carried a disproportionate share of responsibility for receiving 
involuntary migrants. From 2013 to 2014, Italy experienced a 143% 
increase in the number of migrants seeking asylum, and Greece, 
during the same period, undertook a 153% increase in asylum 
applications.106 
                                                                                                             
see also Jim Yardley & Elisabetta Povoledo, Mediterranean Shipwreck Kills 40 
Before a Rescue, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2015) [hereinafter Mediterranean Shipwreck 
Kills 40 Before a Rescue], https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/europe/italy-
migrants-mediterranean-sinking.html [https://perma.cc/WTQ5-P43C] (on file with 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (“[T]he number of people attempting the 
crossing on smuggler boats is rising sharply. The Italian authorities reported that 
nearly 6,000 people were rescued in the Mediterranean in a 48-hour period.”); Jim 
Yardley, Rising Toll on Migrants Leaves Europe in Crisis; 900 May Be Dead at Sea, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Rising Toll on Migrants Leaves Europe in 
Crisis], https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/europe/european-union-
immigration-migrant-ship-capsizes.html [https://perma.cc/3UHR-QB2H] (on file 
with Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (describing how, in one migrant vessel 
disaster off a Greek island, “Greek news media showed video of people flailing in 
the water, or floating on a piece of the boat’s hull, as rescuers with the Greek Coast 
Guard pulled them onto the nearby rocks.”). 
104. Rising Toll on Migrants Leaves Europe in Crisis, supra note 103 
(quoting a survivor of the wreck that killed an estimated 800 people described a 
“three-tiered vessel” filled with migrants: “A few hundred people were forced to 
enter the hold, the lowest level, and locked up so that they would not climb up.”); 
Rick Noack, Meet the Man who Rescued 600 Migrants on his Boat, and Thinks 
Others Could Do the Same, WASH. POST (July 28, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/28/meet-the-man-who-rescued-
600-migrants-on-his-boat-and-thinks-others-could-do-the-same/?utm_term=.c71c9 
4498d94 [https://perma.cc/KE4W-Q58K] (on file with Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review) (quoting one man who devotes time to saving migrants at sea: “[m]any 
[migrants] use inflatable dinghies to cross the sea. Out of the six boats we saw, 
about four were about to sink.”). 
105. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION CRISIS: 
WHY PEOPLE FLEE, WHAT THE EU SHOULD DO (2015), https://www.hrw.org/ 
sites/default/files/report_pdf/eu0615_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2NA-BEAZ] 
(describing how the European Union and its member states “have at times turned 
a blind eye to egregious human rights abuses by recipient governments, and 
development projects in themselves have caused rights violations.”). 
106. Sabrina L. Camboulives, Luck of the Draw for Asylum Seekers in 
Europe: Why the Common European Asylum System Is a Breach of Justice and Why 
a Third Phase of Amendments Is Required, 42 VT. L. REV. 393, 412–13 (2017); see 
also Mario Savino, The Refugee Crisis as a Challenge for Public Law: The Italian 
Case, 17 GERMAN L.J. 981, 983 (2016) (explaining how, between January 2014 and 
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Not all involuntary migrants remained in external border 
states. Many continued to move through Europe, seeking to settle into 
countries like Sweden and Germany, “which in 2015 received almost 
half of all EU asylum applications.” 107  This secondary migration 
movement spurred strong restrictionist responses in transit states 
such as Hungary, where the government erected barbed-wire fences at 
its borders and enacted policies prioritizing the push back of 
involuntary migrants.108 
The actual number of migrants approaching Europe has 
declined. At the peak of migration to the region in 2015, the UNHCR 
estimated over one million arrivals by land and sea.109 For 2018, the 
agency reported 141,472 arriving migrants to Europe.110 The UNHCR 
numbers for 2017 put the region’s migrant arrival number at 
185,139,111 down from 373,652 in 2016.112 
Throughout this recent wave of migration, and despite the 
declining numbers, protectionist sentiments have taken hold. In 2016, 
the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, in opposition to a 
proposed effort to coordinate a response to the arrival of migrants 
across the EU, stated: “For us migration is not a solution but a 
                                                                                                             
September 2016, over 1.5 million migrants reached Europe via the Mediterranean 
Sea, eight times the same number between 2008 and 2013. Two-thirds of this group 
landed on Greek shores, while the remaining one-third reached Italy.). 
107. Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan & Susan Fratzke, Europe’s Migration Crisis 
in Context: Why Now and What Next?, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe%E2%80%99s-migration-crisis-
context-why-now-and-what-next [https://perma.cc/6LU3-843A]; see also Martha F. 
Davis, Cities Rising: European Municipalities and the Refugee Surge, 39 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 683, 698–700 (2016) (discussing the impact of arriving refugees 
on local cities across Europe). 
108. See Phillip Heijmans, Migrant Arrivals Drop as Hungary Enforces 
Tough Law, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/ 
09/migrant-arrivals-drop-hungary-enforces-tough-law-180906194436319.html 
[https://perma.cc/4VPT-RTT2] (describing Hungary’s practice of “‘push-backs’” as 
“a process that allows border police to physically remove asylum seekers within 
8km of the border without due process”). 
109. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, OPERATION PORTAL: 
REFUGEE SITUATIONS–MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION (last visited April 23, 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean [https://perma.cc/QA9Y-
NBEA]. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. UNHCR estimates the total arrivals of migrants to Europe, as of 
April 23, 2019, to be 18,876. Id. 
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problem . . . not medicine but a poison, we don’t need it and won’t 
swallow it.”113  In 2017, the “Alternative for Germany (AfD)” party, 
running on an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim platform, became the first 
far right party to win parliamentary seats since World War II.114 
Woven into these restrictionist responses to the heightened 
involuntary migrant flow into Europe is crisis discourse. An AfD 
representative, for example, described the task of responding to the 
migration crisis as fighting an “invasion of foreigners.” 115  France’s 
former presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, depicted the region’s 
migration flow as “a flood of immigrants that are sweeping all before 
them.”116 
Professor Aleinikoff describes the region’s response to this 
heightened involuntary migration as sending “a political shock wave 
through the European Union and raising existential questions about 
the ‘idea of Europe.’”117 The responses in many instances articulate a 
notion of Europe that rejects the reconfiguration of a political order to 
accommodate migrants, and instead uses the cloak of crisis to maintain 
the status quo for its citizens. 
                                                                                                             
113. Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants Are “Poison” and “Not 
Needed,” THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/jul/26/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-praises-donald-trump 
[https://perma.cc/T8L6-KC3B]. The Orbán government also characterized an effort 
to mandate that they take in refugees as “a rape of EU law.” R. Daniel Kelemen & 
Laurent Pech, Of Red Lines and Red Herrings: The EPP's Delusions about 
Restraining Orbán, INDEX (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:55 am), https://index.hu/english/2019/ 
03/20/epp_fidesz_red_line_expulsion_viktor_orban_manfred_weber_joseph_daul_
manfred_weber/ [https://perma.cc/Hz9Q-5ERX]; see also Bast & Orgad, supra note 
53, at 1590–91.  
114. Judith Vonberg & Nadine Schmidt, Far-Right Party Wins Seats in 
German Parliament for First Time in Decades, CNN (Sept. 25, 2017), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/europe/germany-far-right-party-election/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/9QMK-67ZK]. 
115. German Election: How Right-Wing is Nationalist AfD?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201 [https://perma.cc/ 
LZY4-3M6D]. 
116. Yonette Joseph, In Their Own Words: Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel 
Macron, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017) (quoting Le Pen at an April 2017 rally in 
Marseille), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-
marine-le-pen-quotes.html [https://perma.cc/N2PL-ZVK5] (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Le Pen went on to say: “[T]his is not the 
French way. . . . If we carry on like this, the whole of France will become a gigantic 
no-go zone. . . . A multicultural society is a society that has multiple conflicts.” Id. 
117. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 1. 
 
2019] Defining Detention 203 
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán characterized the EU 
migration response as “madness,” stating: “We must acknowledge that 
the European Union’s misguided immigration policy is responsible for 
this situation.” 118  In this case, Orbán is accurate—it was the EU 
migration system, not the magnitude of migration, that created 
what has been called “a crisis of protection” in the region.119 The legal 
regimes in place when the heightened migration began, as well as 
changes made to the system as a response to a migration “crisis,” 
represent policies of “deterrence, deflection, and return.” 120  The 
consequence of these policy choices is that migration to the region has 
been unmanageable, a condition a spokesperson for the United 
Nations’ International Organization for Migration characterized as “a 
political crisis, not a migrant crisis.”121 
1. An EU Migration System Under Duress 
Among the first signs of strain within the EU migration system 
were the fissures in the EU Schengen Agreement. Pre-dating the most 
recent heightened migration flow to the region, France and Denmark 
in 2011 enacted border controls in reaction to Tunisian and Libyan 
refugees from Italy. 122  Hungary erected a barbed-wire fence on its 
border with Serbia in July of 2015. 123  Germany introduced border 
controls to curtail migration from Austria in September 2015, and 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Slovakia followed with their own 
border measures.124 These deviations represent the most significant 
aberrations the Schengen system has endured.125 
                                                                                                             
118. Ian Traynor, Migrant Crisis: Hungary PM Says Europe in Grip of 
Madness, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness 
[https://perma.cc/QM78-4W9J]. 
119. Bast & Orgad, supra note 53, at 1587. 
120. Siobhán Mullally, A Crisis of Protection in Europe: Migrants at Sea, 110 
PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING 173, 173 (2017). 
121. Miles, supra note 14. International Organization for Migration 
spokesperson Leonard Doyle added: “We are concerned that the toxic narrative 
against migrants, to put it bluntly, be diminished, and people see migration for 
what it is. It’s a necessary part of the modern world, provided it’s managed. The 
issue is that people’s perception is that it’s out of control.” Id. 
122. Park, supra note 5. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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The recent migration to the region also called into question the 
objective of the CEAS to create a uniform EU system to handle asylum 
claims. During this period of heightened migration, the CEAS 
revealed itself to be not a common system but “a collection of discrete 
national systems.”126 Specific deficiencies within the CEAS included 
inconsistencies in how EU states register third-party nationals127 and 
funding shortcomings. 128  These deficiencies were part of why the 
Migration Policy Institute reported that: 
[T]he number of arrivals [of involuntary migrants to 
Europe] alone, while historic, was not solely to blame. 
Structural deficiencies—both legal and operational—
are baked into the very DNA of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) and have long undermined 
Europe’s ability to manage asylum flows in a humane 
and efficient manner.129 
While there have been ad hoc attempts to facilitate cooperation 
in response to recent migration amongst states in the region,130 the 
most significant attempts at systemic change have been to the Dublin 
system. The modifications to Dublin, tellingly, reflect crisis discourse 
                                                                                                             
126. FRANCESCO MAIANI, EUR. PARLIAMENT POLICY DEP’T FOR CITIZENS’ 
RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE REFORM OF THE DUBLIN III REGULATION, 
at 11 (Apr. 2016) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/ 
571360/IPOL_STU(2016)571360_EN. [https://perma.cc/U6XT-7RBH]; see also 
SCHOTEL, supra note 1, at 8–9 (2012) (“Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU has 
undertaken to frame a common policy on immigration but it remains very likely 
that, even under an EU framework, many decisions about the admission of normal 
migrants will remain a competence of individual Member States.”); see also 
WILSHER, supra note 72, at 180 (“Immigration powers over [migrants is] a 
significant bastion of sovereignty . . . reserved to Member States.”). 
127. BEIRENS, supra note 90, at 4.  
128. Id. at 8. 
129. Id. at 1. The MPI report details how these deficiencies in the CEAS play 
out across four stages: (1) at the registration stage; (2) at the reception stage; (3) 
within the procedures and processing of claims; and (4) in the adjudication of 
asylum claims. Id. 
130. Namely, the EU-Turkey migrant transfer agreement and quotas as an 
attempt to share responsibility for refugees entering the external border states. See 
Ramji-Nogales, supra note 19, at 642–43. For more on the EU-Turkey agreement, 
see Eur. Comm’n, EU-Turkey Statement: Two Years On (Apr. 2018), https:// 
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/R77S 
-9TE7]. 
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and prioritize carceral migration control over providing greater 
protection for involuntary migrants. 131  A section of the Dublin III 
Regulation, which went into force in 2014 as a response to post-Arab 
Spring migration flow, is devoted to “preventing” and “managing” the 
crisis, in circumstances when a Member State needs to “deal with the 
situation of particular pressure on its asylum system.”132 The use of 
detention facilities is a key focus of Dublin III, compared to migrant 
detention appearing once in Dublin II.133 
The Dublin system generally has been the subject of 
considerable criticism,134 including that it fails to take into account 
structural inequities and vastly different adjudication processes 
                                                                                                             
131. The Dublin Regulation applies to all members of the European Union, 
with slight differences in Denmark due to “technical reasons.” Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland—countries outside the Union—have 
adopted the Dublin Regulation. See Patrick J. Lyons, Explaining the Rules for 
Migrants: Borders and Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/09/17/world/europe/europe-refugees-migrants-rules.html [https://perma. 
cc/QXJ8-35WW] (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). 
132. Regulation No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31, at art. 33(2) [hereinafter Dublin III Regulation], 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&fr 
om=EN [https://perma.cc/3Z4Y-Z6LZ]. Further, Article 33 of Dublin III directs EU 
Member States to establish a “preventive action plan” to help alleviate pressures 
and crises, and to “draw up a ‘crisis management action plan’ to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of the applicants are not abridged.” Camboulives, supra note 
106, at 402 (citing supra Dublin III Regulation, art. 33). 
133. An entire section of Dublin III (Section V) is devoted to “Detention for 
the purpose of transfer,” with Article 28 describing in detail when detention is 
appropriate, and for how long. The Article emphasizes that detention must last for 
“as short a period as possible,” and there is an explicit requirement that detention 
not last longer than six weeks before being transferred to the responsible Member 
State. Dublin III Regulation, supra note 132, at ¶ 20. 
134. Costello, The Asylum Directive, supra note 84, at 42 (“Most academic 
commentary on the Dublin Convention has been overwhelmingly negative. It 
simply does not work.”). 
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amongst states,135 and that the transfer system is inefficient.136 During 
the recent migration flow, one significant issue with the Dublin 
Regulation was that member states were not required to assist other 
overburdened member states.137 Consequently, the EU external border 
states were not able to adequately process the disproportionate 
number of asylum seekers they received, which in many instances 
caused the moratorium of Dublin.138 
C. Normalizing Detention in Europe 
Starting in the early 1990s, the detention of involuntary 
migrants, particularly of asylum seekers, became a contentious topic 
                                                                                                             
135. Hathaway, supra note 20, at 726 (“Because there is no procedural or 
substantive harmonization of affirmative norms of refugee law in Europe, 
recognition rates for persons with comparable claims differ quite significantly from 
country to country.”). 
136. Rachael E. De Orio, Seeking Sanctuary across the Sea: Why the Influx 
of Refugees and Asylum Seekers to Greece Requires Major Policy Changes, 41 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 76 (2018). 
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2017/9/59ca64354/unhcr-calls-eu-relocation-scheme-continue.html [https://perma. 
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138. Starting in 2013 and peaking in 2015 during the height of migration 
into Europe, the Dublin Regulation has been suspended numerous times by 
individual states, the UNHCR, and by courts. See, e.g., Netherlands: Court of 
Appeal Suspends Dublin Transfer to Poland, EUROPEAN DATABASE OF ASYLUM LAW 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/netherlands-court-
appeal-suspends-dublin-transfer-poland-awb-1311314-art-47-charter [https:// 
perma.cc/9Y3N-TNE8]; Forum Réfugiés, Dublin – France, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE 
(explaining that France suspended transfers to Hungary on several occasions in 
2016 and 2017, to Italy in 2016 and again in 2018, to Bulgaria in 2016, and to 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland in 2017), http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/ 
country/france/asylum-procedure/procedures/dublin [https://perma.cc/R4B6-
46MD]; Cécile Pouilly, UNHCR Urges Suspension of Transfers of Asylum-Seekers 
to Hungary Under Dublin, UN HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Apr. 10, 2017) (calling 
for a suspension of Dublin transfers to Hungary), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/press/2017/4/58eb7e454/unhcr-urges-suspension-transfers-asylum-seeker 
s-hungary-under-dublin.html [https://perma.cc/42XL-887R]; Lyons, supra note 131 
(“The European Union has had a moratorium on Dublin transfers back to Greece 
since 2011, and Hungary unilaterally stopped accepting them in June [2015].”). 
Some argue that reform that will get actual results requires “re-centering EU 
responsibility allocation schemes on one key objective—quick access to asylum 
procedures.” MAIANI, supra note 126. 
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in Europe. 139  In 1995, non-governmental organizations and branch 
offices of the UNHCR in Western Europe reported an increased 
practice of detaining asylum seekers,140 a trend fostered in “the context 
of more restrictive entry and immigration policies” in the region,141 as 
well as a rise of the European prison population generally.142 By the 
turn of the century, the EU developed migration policies that focused 
less on protection and more on management,143 which in turn resulted 
in an increased use of detention as migration control in the region.144 
According to Migreurop, 145  between 2000 and 2012 the number of 
immigration detention facilities in Europe and Mediterranean 
countries increased from 324 to 473.146 France, for example, detained 
                                                                                                             
139. Jane Hughes & Ophelia Field, Recent Trends in the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers in Western Europe, in DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE: 
ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE 5 (Jane Hughes & Fabrice Liebaut, eds., 1998). 
140. Id. at 7. 
141. Id. at 6. The authors provide examples of legislation passed in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Denmark, and Austria. The restrictive 
laws include creating ways to detain asylum seekers, increasing the permissible 
length of detention, and removing or cutting public benefits for asylum seekers. Id. 
at 8–10. For example, France in 1994 amended its asylum law to create 
international “waiting zones” in railway stations, permitting the detention of 
asylum seekers for up to twenty days. Id. at 9. 
142. Id. at 8. The trend of non-citizen, non-criminal detention increasing 
alongside a ballooning domestic criminal population mirrors the trend in the United 
States when the 1980s “War on Drugs” created a pathway for increased detention 
of non-citizens. See Sinha, supra note 2, at 14. 
143. See generally SCHOTEL, supra note 1, at 21–23 (discussing Europe’s 
migration policies as falling into the “management paradigm”). 
144. Council Directive 2008/115, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98; see also Lydie 
Arbogast, Migrant Detention in the European Union: A Thriving Business 11 
(Emmanuel Blanchard et al. eds., Eurideas trans., 2016), http://www. 
migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/migrant-detention-eu-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAz4-48CQ] 
(explaining how, under European law, foreign nationals present on EU territory 
without leave to remain, and, in certain cases, asylum seekers, while their 
application is being processed, may be detained for the purpose of removal in 
accordance with the Return Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive 
respectively). 
145. Introduction to the Migreurop Network, MIGREUROP, http://www. 
migreurop.org/article643.html?lang=fr [https://perma.cc/Q3HT-4UM5] (Migreurop 
is “a network of activists and scholars aimed at spreading knowledge about the 
generalization of retention for undocumented foreigners as well as the increasing 
number of [detention] camps”). 
146. AYTEN GÜNDOĞDU, RIGHTLESSNESS IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS: HANNAH 
ARENDT AND THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES OF MIGRANTS 117 (2015). 
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approximately 28,000 immigrants in 2003, and by 2015 that number 
nearly doubled to 47,565.147 
Migrant detention in Europe continues to proliferate as a 
response to the region’s recent migration “crisis.” As of November 2016, 
Spain had eight dedicated migrant detention facilities, along with 
transit facilities within airports and other travel hubs, and “ad hoc” 
facilities off of the coast. 148  Hungary now operates six migrant 
detention centers, some of which they refer to as “transit zones.”149 
States across the region have characterized their migrant detention 
practices as other euphemisms such as registration camps, reception 
or holding centers, guesthouses, and border zone camps.150 
In a trend similar to the ownership and operation of immigrant 
detention facilities in the United States, migrant detention in Europe 
has become increasingly privatized.151 The use of for-profit companies 
to run migrant detention centers in the region began at the turn of the 
century, with the United Kingdom leading the movement. 152  In 
response to the recent heightened migration flow, states such as 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, and Greece have turned to for-
                                                                                                             
147. Admir Skodo, How Immigration Detention Compares Around the World, 
CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-immigration-
detention-compares-around-the-world-76067 [https://perma.cc/LB76-GFW3]; 
GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT: FRANCE (last updated Oct. 2018), https://www. 
globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/france [https://perma.cc/ZJ29-2DZL]. 
148. GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, SPAIN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
PROFILE (Nov. 2016) https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/11/Spain-Immigration-Detention-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2GT-A6RJ]. 
149. GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, HUNGARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
PROFILE (Sept. 2016) https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/09/Hungary_immigration_detention_report_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PU8X-A42X] (describing a “transit zone” as a closed, fenced, heavily guarded 
complex that uses shipping containers near its border with Serbia.) The Röszke 
detention facility consists of shipping containers converted into lodging and dining 
facilities. Id. Migrants in Röszke live “in containers in small locked compounds,” 
that are guarded at all times and surrounded by razor-wire fences. Id. 
150. OPEN ACCESS NOW, THE HIDDEN FACE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
CAMPS IN EUROPE, 2F (Dec. 2014), http://www.epim.info/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/10/1A-The-hidden-face-of-immigration-detention-camps-in-Europe-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WY9T-GEBL]. 
151. See Sinha, supra note 2, at 21–24. 
152. OPEN ACCESS NOW, supra note 150, at 4D. The European Commissioner 
for Justice and Home Affairs in 2007 stated: “security is no longer a monopoly of 
the public sector, it is part of the common good, and responsibility for its 
implementation must be shared between the public and private sectors.” Arbogast, 
supra note 146. 
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profit companies to manage their growing migrant detention 
portfolio.153 This trend is significant with respect to whether policies 
are trending toward or away from migrant-protective measures, given 
that for-profit facilities generate more reported incidents of human 
rights violations, both in the United States154 and in Europe.155 
III. THE TREATMENT OF MIGRANTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Migrants and the European Human Rights System 
In her comprehensive study of the treatment of migrants by 
the European human rights system, When Humans Become 
Migrants,156 Professor Marie-Bénédicte Dembour analyzes the official 
records—the travaux préparatories—of the Convention and concludes 
that “[m]igrants were hardly a consideration in the newly created 
human rights scheme.”157 Similarly, noting the non-universality of the 
Convention’s coverage,158 Professor Marco Duranti describes the scope 
of the system’s protection this way: “The European human rights 
system was directed at safeguarding those freedoms that the European 
                                                                                                             
153. Arbogast, supra note 146, at 38–40. 
154. Manny Fernandez & Katie Benner, The Billion-Dollar Business of 
Operating Shelters for Migrant Children, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/us/migrant-shelters-border-crossing.html 
[https://perma.cc/VCG7-LF4M] (on file with Columbia Human Rights Law Review); 
Alice Sperry, Detained, Then Violated, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/immigration-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-
dhs/ [https://perma.cc/U6H6-BHCY]. 
155. Arbogast, supra note 144, at 47.  
156. Professor Dembour argues that this feature of the European human 
rights system is not shared by the Inter-American human rights system. See 
generally MARIE-BÈNÈDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS (2015) 
[hereinafter WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS]. 
157. Id. at 2. 
158. MARCO DURANTI, THE CONSERVATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY, TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 210, 323 (2017) (stating that the European human rights 
system is designed for “a bounded cultural space restricted to those nations who 
embraced a common set of ethical values derived from the shared history of their 
peoples. The Universal Declaration, by contrast, explicitly grounded its human 
rights principles in metaphysical assumptions regarding inherent human 
attributes.”). 
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unity movements described as derived from Western Europe’s 
premodern Christian and humanist heritage within the confines of 
what [Winston] Churchill termed ‘democratic European 
civilisation.’”159 
The following discussion examines the treatment of migrants’ 
rights in the text of the Convention, by the now-defunct European 
Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), and by the Court. The 
Commission and the Court for decades largely ignored the subject, and 
the Convention’s original text only mentions migrants in the context of 
exempting the group from the rights it provides. Beginning in 1985, 
the Court started issuing judgments on migrant claims, leading some 
commentators to assert that migrants were “lucky” to rely on the 
Convention, and that it is a privilege that they achieved “indirectly.”160 
1. “Except For:” When the European Convention on 
Human Rights Exempts, and When It Covers, 
Migrants 
An overview detailing the treatment of migrants by the 
instrument governing the Commission and the Court provides context 
relevant to examining how this particular human rights system has 
handled migrant detention. Generally, the original text of the 
Convention makes explicit mention of migrants once, by exempting 
them from particular protections provided in its articles. 161  Its 
provision specifically providing for protection against unlawful 
deprivation of liberty expressly pertains to migrants as a group that 
might not have otherwise been protected. The following outlines the 
provisions of the Convention to date that contend with migrants’ 
rights.  
                                                                                                             
159. Id. at 210. Duranti describes criticisms of the Conventions scope as 
“posit[ing] that its progenitors only had on their minds the defense of democracies 
on the continent.” Id. at 3. 
160. WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 5, n.13 
(expressing “indirectly” in French as par ricochet and, more harshly, “par 
effraction” (forced illegal entry). 
161. Contrasting the Convention with one of the Inter-American human 
rights system’s founding documents, the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, which contains “specific safeguards for aliens,” Dembour states: “By 
contrast, such protective intent is absent from the European Convention, which 
contains only two references to the alien . . . curtailing rather than expanding the 
rights of migrants.” Id. at 36. 
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Article 16 is the provision in the Convention’s original text that 
explicitly and exclusively refers to migrants by using the term 
“aliens.”162 It does so by qualifying that the protections of Articles 10 
and 11, which provide for the freedoms of expression, and assembly 
and association, respectively, are not applicable to migrants’ exercise 
of political activity.163 Along the same vein, Article 16 also exempts 
states that restrict the political activity of migrants from Article 14’s 
prohibition on discrimination.164 Referred to as the “alien clause,” this 
provision was included in the Convention without much discussion 
amongst its drafters.165 
Article 5.1(f) is the other provision in the original text of the 
Convention that addresses, and in certain situations exempts, 
migrants. Article 5 protects against unlawful deprivation of liberty and 
security, starting with an affirmation that “[e]veryone has the right to 
liberty and security of person.”166 The six exceptions to the canopy of 
“everyone,” however, dominate the provision’s text. The last categorical 
exception includes migrants,167 specifically permitting the deprivation 
                                                                                                             
162. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 16, Europ. T.S. No. 
5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European 
Convention]. For a discussion of the use of “alien” in European law as signifying 
undesirable migrants, see Alison Bashford & Jane McAdam, The Right to Asylum: 
Britain's 1905 Aliens Act and the Evolution of Refugee Law, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 
309, 318 (2014). For an in-depth account of the history of the term “alien” in 
reference to immigrants in the United States, see Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career 
of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United 
States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 71 (2003). 
163. European Convention, supra note 162, at art. 16. 
164. Id. There have been calls for the abolition of Article 16 since the late 
1970s. See WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 35. 
165. WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 36 (“[T]he alien 
clause was hardly debated during the travaux prépatoires of the Convention, every 
participant to these implicitly taking its necessity for granted.”). Dembour 
surmises: “[T]he imposition of restrictions on aliens’ activities seems to have been 
the price to pay for having the protection of the European Convention extended to 
‘everyone’ falling under the jurisdiction of a member state, as proclaimed in Article 
1”). Id. at 35. 
166. European Convention, supra note 162, at art. 5.1. 
167. The other subsections in Article 5 provide for lawful deprivation of 
liberty for: (a) a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) a person for non-
compliance with a lawful court order or to fulfill any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) a person who poses a flight risk and is being brought before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense; (d) a minor for 
the purpose of educational supervision or to bring before competent legal authority; 
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of liberty in the context of state action seeking to deport or extradite 
an individual.168 
By singling out migrants subject to deportation proceedings as 
among the categories of individuals that may not be covered by Article 
5, the Convention signaled that detention is part of states’ sovereign 
right to control migration.169 Part III.C of this Article explores in detail 
the Court’s interpretation of Article 5.1(f), which generally has leaned 
heavily toward recognizing state sovereignty over migrants’ liberty 
interest.170 
The Convention also exempts migrants in a protocol ratified 
after the original text that defines the scope of the right to freedom of 
movement. Article 2 of Protocol 4 reads: “Everyone lawfully within the 
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty 
of movement and freedom to choose their residence.”171 As such, the 
right to freedom of movement is expressly limited to individuals who 
                                                                                                             
(e) persons for the prevention of spreading infectious diseases and others deemed 
dangerous or unwanted “persons of unsound minds, alcoholics or drug addicts or 
vagrants.” European Convention, supra note 162, at art. 5.1(a)–(e). 
168. Id. art. 5.1(f), (providing for “the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person 
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”). The 
subsequent three subsections of Article 5 address procedural concerns (5.2, 5.3, and 
5.4), and the last, 5.5, provides for an enforceable right to compensation. Id. 
169. See Cathryn Costello, Immigration Detention: The Grounds Beneath 
Our Feet, 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 143, 147–48 (2015) [hereinafter Costello, 
Immigration Detention] (“By leaving immigration detention in its own silo, subject 
to looser standards of justification, human rights law risks obscuring the question 
of why enforcing a particular form of law or preventing certain risks from 
materializing should be assumed to warrant detention, in contrast to other fields.”). 
170. A frequent accompaniment to challenges under the Convention 
concerning the treatment of migrant detention is Article 3, which prohibits “torture 
or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.” European Convention, supra 
note 162, at art. 3. The application of Article 3 to migrants can attach during one 
or both of the following scenarios. The first is an alleged violation of Article 3 in the 
case where a state seeks to remove a migrant to their country of origin. The second 
scenario relates to migrant detention, namely that the conditions of confinement 
violate Article 3. 
171. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, ¶ 1, Sept. 16, 1963, 1496 U.N.T.S. 263, E.T.S. 
No. 046 [hereinafter Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights]. 
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are lawfully inside the borders of a state, which by definition excludes 
migrants seeking (but who have not yet obtained) lawful status.172 
The Convention does affirmatively confer rights to migrants in 
a few instances. By covering national origin and birth status, Article 
14 grants migrants rights against discrimination.173 As discussed in 
infra Part III.B.2, an analysis of Article 14 was the principle part of the 
Court’s first judgment related to migrants. 
The remaining provisions explicitly addressing migrants’ 
rights are protocols ratified subsequent to the original articles of the 
Convention. Both contemplate the rights of migrants in the context of 
deportations, and both are concerned with procedural due process. The 
first prohibits the “collective expulsion of aliens,” thereby requiring 
an individualized finding that removal is warranted.174  The second 
directly provides for procedural safeguards when states seek to expel 
migrants.175  
                                                                                                             
172. This is not unique to the Convention. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Freedom of Movement and Undocumented Migrants, 51 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173, 174 
(2016) (noting that “Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), applies only to individuals lawfully within a State 
territory - not to the undocumented.”); see also Costello, Human Rights and the 
Elusive Universal Subject, supra note 71, at 275 (pointing out that the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, specifically Article 26, restricts the right to 
freedom of movement to those “‘lawfully in the territory.’”). 
173. European Convention, supra note 162, at art. 14. Specifically, the 
provision sets forth that the enumerated rights laid out in the Convention “shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.” Id. For an in-depth examination 
of Article 14, see Marek Antoni Nowicki, The European Convention of Human 
Rights: Prohibition of Discrimination, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC 
L.J. 17, 18 (1999); see also Ivana Radacic, Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 841, 842–51 (2008) (exploring 
the Court’s gender discrimination jurisprudence). 
174. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 
supra note 171, at art. 4. 
175. Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1984, 1525 U.N.T.S. 195, E.T.S. No. 
117. 
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2. The Court: Light on Migrant Judgments, Heavy on 
Sovereignty 
The Court, operational since 1959, is the enforcement 
mechanism of the Convention. The Court has a unique breadth of 
authority vis-à-vis other international tribunals, in that its judgments 
are binding on both state and non-state entities. As such, the Court’s 
mandate includes issuing judgments on applications from individuals 
alleging human rights violations committed by states.176 
As noted by several scholars, the case law of the Court 
addressing the rights of migrants, including jurisprudence on their 
detention, is relatively new.177 This is not because migrants and their 
lawyers failed to utilize the Convention’s protections. To the contrary, 
they were “amongst the first to understand and to try to use the 
potential of the Convention.”178 The reason why the Court initially did 
not issue judgments addressing migrants’ rights had to do with the 
now-defunct Commission. From five years before the Court was 
operational to 1998, the Commission was the forum for the beginning 
and end of migrants’ applications. It did so by finding that migrant 
cases lacked the merit necessary for the Court’s consideration. As a 
result, the Commission served as a gatekeeper that ensured that 
migrants’ applications rarely reached the Court.179  
                                                                                                             
176. DURANTI, supra note 158, at 1–2 (“Some have described the Strasbourg 
court as a Supreme Court of Europe with prerogatives of constitutional review akin 
to that of the mighty US Supreme Court.”). 
177. See WILSHER, supra note 72, at 140 (“[T]he case-law is relatively new 
and still evolving.”); WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 2 (“T]he 
Court first pronounced on a ‘migrant case’ only in 1985, at a time when it had 
already developed an important case law in other areas.”). 
178. WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 2. 
179. For a number of migrants, their efforts translated into “friendly 
settlements,” but a majority “came up against a brick wall at Strasbourg.” Id. See 
also Marat Kengerlinsky, Immigration and Asylum Policies in the European Union 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 101, 106 
(2007) (“[M]any of the cases [before the commission] never went beyond the 
admissibility stage and were declared manifestly ill-founded before being 
considered fully on their merits.”). For more on the Commission’s function 
generally, see DURANTI, supra note 158, at 386 (“The now-defunct Strasbourg 
commission was tasked with screening applications from private parties and 
determining whether to refer them to the Strasbourg court. Before 1998, . . . state 
parties were not required to recognize the court’s jurisdiction and the right of 
individual petition.”). 
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The Court issued its first judgment concerning migrants’ 
rights in 1985, in Abulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United 
Kingdom (hereinafter ACB v. UK).180 The applicants were non-native, 
permanent residents of the UK alleging that their spouses’ denial of 
entry181 violated rights and protections provided by the Convention, 
including the right to respect private and family life provided by Article 
8,182 and Article 14’s prohibition against discrimination.183 
The final judgment, issued by the Grand Chamber,184 shaped 
the Court’s future decisions concerning migrant rights in several 
significant ways. First, the ACB Court’s reticence to recognize race 
discrimination claims made by migrants is one that it has repeated in 
subsequent Article 14 migrant cases.185 Second, and more relevant to 
                                                                                                             
180. Abulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom (No. 94), Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1985) [hereinafter ACB v. UK]. It also was the first time the Court 
“expounded its approach to sex discrimination claims.” Radacic, supra note 173, at 
844; see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 172, at 185 (discussing the Court’s 
extensive jurisprudence on whether the right to family unity includes migrants’ 
right to remain, especially those who face removal because of criminal convictions). 
181. ACB v. UK, supra 180, ¶¶ 57–58. At issue was the distinction in 
legislation passed in 1980 that effectively denied male spouses the right to entry 
and reunification with their spouses under circumstances in which the government 
would have granted entry to female spouses. 
182. European Convention, supra note 162, at art. 8.1. 
183. ACB v. UK, supra 180, ¶ 70 (alleging specifically that the law 
discriminated against them on the grounds of sex, race, and, for one applicant, 
birth). The applicants also alleged that the state’s discrimination based on their 
national origin constituted degrading treatment in violation of Article 3, which the 
Court rejected. Id. ¶ 57(2). The Court upheld the applicants’ remaining claim that 
there was no effective domestic remedy for their complaint of discrimination on the 
ground of sex. Id. ¶ 93. 
184. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights hears 
cases referred to it after a relinquishment of jurisdiction by a Chamber, or when it 
accepts a party’s request for referral after a Chamber judgment is issued. For the 
general practice information on Grand Chamber panels, see European Court of 
Human Rights: Composition of the Court, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www. 
echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/judges&c=#newComponent_1346152138668
_pointer [https://perma.cc/39DY-VTKP]. 
185. See generally Marie-Benedicte Dembour, Still Silencing the Racism 
Suffered by Migrants – the Limits of Current Developments under Article 14 ECHR, 
11 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 221, 222, 226 (2009) (positing that despite case law 
developments regarding racial discrimination against Roma applicants in Eastern 
European countries, the European Court of Human Rights has avoided addressing 
racism against migrants by hewing to an exceptionally high standard of proof and 
rejecting the concept of indirect discrimination). In ACB, the Court held that, taken 
together with Article 8, the UK’s immigration law violated Article 14’s prohibition 
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the analysis in this Article, is the judgment’s emphasis on state 
sovereignty as curtailing migrants’ rights, which the Grand Chamber 
summarized in this way: “[T]he Court cannot ignore that the present 
case is concerned . . . with immigration and that, as a matter of well-
established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a 
State has the right to control entry of non-nationals into its 
territory.”186 
B. The European Court of Human Rights and Detention as a 
Means to Control Migration 
Almost a decade after the Court issued the ACB v. UK 
judgment, it delivered its first decisions addressing migrant detention. 
The Court’s initial decisions weighed significantly in favor of state 
sovereignty over protecting migrants’ liberty interest. The Court, in 
subsequent cases, somewhat softened its strong presumption that a 
state’s action of detaining migrants is lawful. Member states’ increased 
use of detention, leading up to carceral migration control practices in 
response to the recent heightened migration flow into the region, has 
caused the Court to issue additional judgments on migrant detention. 
The subject of crisis appears in these judgments in response to states 
evoking it to argue their right to curtail migrants’ liberty interest in 
extraordinary circumstances. The Court’s recent opinions generally, 
however, have placed greater weight on migrants’ rights than the 
history of the Convention and the Court would have suggested. 
1. Early Judgments on Migrant Detention 
The Court issued what for some time were its leading decisions 
on migrant detention in the late 1990s. The threshold question of the 
applicability of Article 5.1—whether a state’s migrant detention 
                                                                                                             
against sex discrimination. ACB v. UK, supra note 180, ¶ 74–83. However, it did 
not find that the law discriminates on the grounds of race or birth. Id. ¶ 84–89. 
186. ACB v. UK, supra note 180, ¶ 67. The ACB Court’s decision with respect 
to the applicants’ Article 8 claim similarly made a long-lasting impact on 
subsequent migrant judgments. The Court held that there was no “lack of respect” 
for the applicants’ family life because they could live together in their home 
countries, and thus no violation of Article 8 on its own. Id. ¶ 68–69. This 
interpretation of Article 8 laid the groundwork for the Court to find non-admission 
a violation only in exceptional circumstances. See WHEN HUMANS BECOME 
MIGRANTS, supra note 156, at 3 (stating that the Court has reached “verdicts of 
violation in only a handful of family reunification cases.”). 
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practice rises to deprivation of liberty—was addressed by its judgment 
in Amuur v. France. 187  In that case, the Court found that holding 
migrants in “transit zones,” including airports, constitutes detention 
despite the argument that migrants at transit zones are only 
prohibited from entering the country, but are free to leave. The Amuur 
judgment laid out the criteria for when a state’s actions amount to 
depriving migrants of liberty,188  and in doing so set limitations on 
states’ sovereignty rights over migration control measures. 
The Court returned to interpreting the Convention as 
primarily protecting state sovereignty over migrants’ rights in its 
initial judgments interpreting Article 5.1(f), namely whether the 
detention is lawful. As discussed previously in section III.B.1, the 
provision’s exemption of migrants contemplates two scenarios—the 
detention of a migrant awaiting deportation, and the detention of a 
migrant seeking entry without authorization, including potential 
asylum seekers.189 
In a judgment pertaining to the first scenario of migrant 
detention pending deportation, Chahal v. UK,190 the Grand Chamber 
                                                                                                             
187. Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 25, 1996). The 
European Commission on Human Rights referred to the Court the applicants’ 
Article 5.1 allegation, even though the original petition included allegations that 
the state also violated Article 3’s prohibition of torture or inhumane or degrading 
treatment; Article 6’s right to a fair trial; and Article 13’s right to an effective 
remedy. Id. ¶ 30 (“The applicants Mahad, Lahima, Abdelkader and Mohammed 
Amuur and eighteen other Somali nationals applied to the Commission on 27 
March 1992. They alleged breaches of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention (art. 
3, art. 5, art. 6, art. 13).”). 
188. See id. ¶ 42 (“[A]ccount must be taken of a whole range of criteria such 
as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in 
question.”). 
189. See supra note 168 (quoting the text of art. 5.1(f)). 
190. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, ¶ 117, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(Nov. 15, 1996). 
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ruled191 that the state did not violate Article 5.1(f).192 In doing so, it laid 
the important foundation that the Convention does not mandate a 
state to demonstrate that the detention of a non-citizen is justified by 
particular circumstances: “[A]ll that is required . . . is that ‘action is 
being taken with a view to deportation.’”193 
Over ten years later, the Court similarly rejected the 
application of a necessity test in Saadi v. U.K.,194 when it addressed 
Article 5.1(f)’s exemption for the detention of unauthorized entering 
migrants.195 The judgment of the Fourth Section of the Court applied 
                                                                                                             
191. The Grand Chamber of the Court issued the only decision in Chahal 
because under then Rule 51 (now Rule 72) of the Rules of the Court, the Chamber 
relinquished jurisdiction to a Grand Chamber. European Court of Human Rights, 
Rules of Court, Registry of the Court (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review). Under Rule 73, when the Chamber does not relinquish jurisdiction, the 
Grand Chamber may issue a judgment on a case under Article 43 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (providing that any party to the case may, in 
exceptional cases, request within three months from the date of judgment that the 
Grand Chamber rehear the case). Id. 
192. The Court also addressed allegations related to both the applicant’s 
detention and deportation. The Grand Chamber found that applicant’s removal 
from the United Kingdom to India would violate Article 3’s protection against 
“torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment,” substantiating that 
there is a real risk that he would be subject to treatment in violation of the provision 
as a suspected Sikh militant. Chahal, App. No. 22414/93, ¶ 107. The Court also 
examined whether the applicants were provided effective remedies before the 
national courts to challenge Mr. Chahal’s detention pursuant to Article 5 
paragraphs 4 and 13 and concluded that they did not. Chahal, App. No. 22414/93, 
¶¶ 140–55. 
193. Chahal, App. No. 22414/93, ¶ 112. The Court did, however, articulate 
that the detention is lawful only during ongoing removal proceedings: “[A]ny 
deprivation of liberty under Article 5 para. 1(f) will be justified only for as long as 
deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted 
with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible . . . .” Id. ¶ 113. 
Nonetheless, Professor Costello describes the Court ruling as “treating those facing 
deportation as accordingly liable to detention.” Costello, Immigration Detention 
supra note 169, at 152. 
194. Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 65, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 
29, 2008). 
195. See Costello, Immigration Detention, supra note 169, at 148 (explaining 
that in Saadi, “[t]here was no legal obligation to show that detention was necessary 
to achieve any particular aim in the individual case, ie [sic] that there was a ground 
for the detention, but rather once the migrant is classed as an ‘unauthorised 
entrant’, [sic] she is detainable.”); GÜNDOĞDU, supra note 146 at 119–20 (“In a move 
justifying detention undertaken simply for administrative expediency, the Court 
concluded that Saadi’s detention was not in violation of the right to liberty given 
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the Chahal rule by holding that the state did not have to show that the 
detention was necessary, only that it was not arbitrary or excessive.196 
The Grand Chamber took up the Saadi case and, in agreeing 
that there was no Article 5.1(f) violation, endorsed the short-term 
detention of asylum seekers when expedited case processing is deemed 
necessary. The Saadi Court placed at the forefront states’ sovereignty 
over migration control: “To interpret . . . Article 5 §1(f) as permitting 
detention only of a person who is shown to be trying to evade entry 
restrictions would be to place too narrow a construction on the terms 
of the provision and on the power of the State to exercise its undeniable 
right [to] control [migration].”197 Additionally, in determining whether 
the detention of an asylum seeker was necessary, the Court validated 
the state invoking crisis to justify such detention.198  
                                                                                                             
the ‘administrative problems’ faced by the UK in the face of ‘increasingly high 
numbers of asylum-seekers.’”). 
196. Saadi, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 45. The Grand Chamber found that the 
applicant’s detention was not arbitrary, because officials released him after 
adjudicating his asylum claim and not excessive because the detention lasted seven 
days. Id. ¶ 46. 
197. Saadi, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 65. The partly dissenting opinion, authored 
by all six of the judges who dissented from the majority’s Article 5.1(f) judgment, 
focused on the fact that Dr. Saadi was an asylum seeker, and that the majority’s 
application of the Chahal decision to the first limb of the provision as to 
unauthorized entries does not distinguish between asylum seekers and migrants 
detained awaiting deportation for committing a crime. Ayten Gündoğdu notes that 
this criticism of the majority ruling, also articulated by UNHCR and other human 
rights non-governmental organizations who criticized the Saadi judgment, “fails 
to confront how these distinctions themselves are at the root of the problem, as 
they allow the states to legitimize detention as a necessary and effective 
measure . . . .” GÜNDOĞDU, supra note 146, at 123.  
198. “[T]he Court finds that, given the difficult administrative problems with 
which the United Kingdom was confronted during the period in question, with 
increasingly high numbers of asylum-seekers . . . it was not incompatible with 
Article 5.1(f) of the Convention to detain the applicant . . . .” Saadi, App. No. 
13229/03, ¶ 80; see also Costello, Immigration Detention, supra note 169, at 150 
(noting that the domestic courts, specifically the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords, held that Dr. Saadi’s “detention was acceptable, given that the UK was 
experiencing an increase in asylum-seekers”); GÜNDOĞDU, supra note 195, at 120 
(characterizing this ruling as “justifying detention undertaken simply for 
administrative expediency”). The number of migrants seeking asylum in the late 
1990s rose steadily in the U.K. and other states in the region, peaking in 2000, the 
year Dr. Saadi sought asylum. Asylum Seekers Figures, BBC (Feb. 7, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1157031.stm [https://perma.cc/2TQ3-W4EX]. 
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In the years leading up to the recent heightened migration into 
Europe, the Court has built on its Chahal and Saadi decisions in its 
analysis of Article 5.1(f) to provide for a more migrant-protective 
analysis on the issue of detention. This has included analyzing migrant 
detention with additional safeguards such as mandating a link 
between deportation and detention, requiring states to make good faith 
and sustained efforts to effect the deportation of detained migrants, 
and characterizing detention as a measure of last resort.199 The next 
section includes an examination of whether the Court’s judgments 
have continued this trend in the context of recent migration flows 
characterized as creating a crisis for the region.  
2. Recent Judgments on Detention: Capitulating to a 
Crisis? 
The Court has issued judgments on migrant detention that 
have contended with the relationship between crisis discourse and 
carceral migration control in the context of the heightened migration 
into Europe that started in 2011. Perhaps predictably, states have used 
the cloak of crisis in their arguments for shielding migration detention 
from the human rights standards provided by the Convention. 
The discussion that follows surveys the Court’s post-crisis migrant 
detention decisions to assess the extent to which it has validated these 
arguments. It highlights judgments representative of how the Court 
consistently has ruled that Article 5 protections are applicable to 
detention measures created in response to the recent migration into 
the region. It also examines how crisis discourse has not caused the 
Court to deviate from the standards it developed after the Chahal and 
Saadi judgments regarding the lawfulness of migrant detention under 
Article 5.1(f). 
The migration crisis has had the most influence over the 
Court’s migrant detention rulings on detention conditions. Specifically, 
viewing carceral conditions as reflecting a state of emergency has led 
the Court, in some instances, to rule that the detention is not in 
                                                                                                             
199. Costello, Immigration Detention supra note 169, at 152–55; Laurens 
Lavrysen, European Asylum Law and the ECHR: An Uneasy Coexistence, 4 
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 197, 233–34 (2012); Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive 
Universal Subject, supra note 71, at 281–82; Francesca Ippolito, Detention of 
Irregular Migrants: Dialogue and Divergence Between the Inter-American and 
European Human Rights Courts, 65 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
583, 588 (2012). 
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violation of the Convention’s Article 3 prohibition on degrading or 
inhumane conditions. 
On the application of Article 5, beyond challenging the 
admissibility of a claim based on procedural grounds, states have tried 
to use the characterization of migration as a crisis to challenge the 
applicability of Article 5.1 to their detention practices. An example of 
this is Italy’s arguments in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy.200 In response 
to a spike in migration following the Arab Spring, the state re-opened 
the Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza (“CSPA”) on the island of 
Lampedusa. Italian officials also later held the applicants on moored 
ships.201 The state characterized both the CSPA and the moored ships 
as “not detention facilities but open reception facilities,”202 facilities 
which were in use because of the supposed migration crisis and 
dangerous migrants: 
Faced with a humanitarian and logistical emergency, 
the Italian authorities had been obliged to seek new 
premises which, in the Government’s view, could not be 
regarded as places of detention and arrest. The 
surveillance of the CSPA by the Italian authorities was 
                                                                                                             
200. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, App. No 16483/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 15, 
2016) [hereinafter Khlaifia GC judgment]. 
201. In September of 2011, the Italian coastguard intercepted the applicants’ 
vessels, who were eventually transferred to Lampedusa. After violent protests and 
a fire erupted in the CSPA, Italian authorities transferred the applicants to a sports 
park, from which they escaped. Government officials subsequently apprehended 
them during protests in Lampedusa, and ultimately held the applicants for several 
days on moored ships in the port of Palermo. Approximately fourteen days after 
their arrival, Italian authorities removed the applicants to Tunisia under the 
authority of an ad hoc agreement. 
202. Khlaifia GC judgment, supra note 200, ¶ 61. In the case of the CSPA, it 
characterized the facility as an “initial reception and accommodation centre” to 
provide migrants first aid and basic shelter. Id. ¶ 32. The government relied on 
Italian law when making this argument. However, it is questionable as to whether 
the government’s argument would withstand its own law. See Maria Pichou, 
Reception or Detention Centres? The Detention of Migrants and the EU ‘Hotspot’ 
Approach in the Light of the European Convention on Human Rights, 99 CRITICAL 
Q. FOR LEGIS. & L. 114, 122 (2016) (“[N]ational law provided only for the 
establishment of ‘centres of identification and expulsion,’ where the detainees were 
provided with the right to have the legality of their detention reviewed by a Court. 
Consequently, only the detention of aliens in [these centres] had a legal basis under 
Italian law.”) Nonetheless, the Grand Chamber stated that “[e]ven measures 
intended for the protection or taken in the interest of the person concerned may be 
regarded as a deprivation of liberty.” Khlaifia GC judgment, supra note 200, ¶ 71. 
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merely protective, in order to avoid criminal or harmful 
acts being committed by the migrants or against the 
local inhabitants.203 
Judgments such as Khlaifia contend with the inadmissibility 
claim made early in the Court’s jurisprudence, including in Amuur v. 
France,204  namely that migrant detention is not actually detention. 
Hungary made this argument in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary 
regarding the “Röszke transit zone” it built on the border between 
Hungary and Serbia at the height of the migration to the region in 
2015.205 Like in Amuur, Hungary claimed that involuntary migrants in 
Röszke were not deprived of their liberty since they were “free to leave 
the territory of the transit zone in the direction of Serbia.”206 The Court 
                                                                                                             
203. Khlaifia GC judgment, supra note 200, ¶ 59. The Italian government 
also argued in both proceedings that the applicants do not fall within the scope of 
Article 5.1(f) because they were not held pending deportation or extradition but 
instead were temporarily allowed to enter Italy. Id. ¶ 81. The Grand Chamber 
dismissed this argument by noting that the precise language of the Convention 
includes “lawful arrest or detention . . . to prevent his effecting an unauthorized 
entry into the country” or when “deportation or extradition” proceedings are 
pending. Id. ¶ 94. 
204. See text accompanying footnotes 187–188.  
205. See HUNGARIAN HELSINK COMM., BEST INTEREST OUT OF SIGHT: THE 
TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKING CHILDREN IN HUNGARY 3 (2017), http://www. 
refworld.org/pdfid/5937afe44.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RES-9QVU]. Röszke is one of 
Hungary’s two “transit zones”—the other is the Tompa transit zone, bordering 
Croatia. See Migration Issues in Hungary, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (June 29, 
2018), http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary [https://perma.cc/SX5Z-
EA3D]. See generally Benjamin Novak, UNHCR Chief Says Hungary’s Transit 
Zones Are Really Just Detention Centers, BUDAPEST BEACON (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://budapestbeacon.com/unhcr-chief-says-hungarys-transit-zones-are-really-
just-detention-centers/ [https://perma.cc/NR3Y-PRAM] (noting that “[r]efugees in 
Röszke live in containers in small locked compounds”). 
206. Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 47287/15, ¶ 49, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 18, 
2017) (citing a report by the UNHCR). The Grand Chamber held hearings on Ilias 
and Ahmed v. Hungary on April 18, 2018, see Press Release, European Court of 
Human Rights, Grand Chamber Hearing in Case of Asylum-Seekers Held in 
Hungarian Border Zone Before Being Sent to Serbia (Apr. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). A judgment from the Grand Chamber is 
still pending. See Cases Pending Before the Grand Chamber, EUR. COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings/gcpendin 
g&c [https://perma.cc/BD6H-6VTY]. 
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denied the state’s claim, recognizing the applicability of  the applicant’s 
Article 5 claims.207 
The Court’s consistent finding that Article 5 applies to migrant 
detention practices even  when states invoke the specter of crisis has 
meant that judgments have gone on to address whether states’ carceral 
migration practices are lawful under Article 5.1(f).  In its analyses, the 
Court has applied the additional safeguards it articulated after its 
Chahal and Saadia rulings to determine whether the liberty 
deprivation was lawful.208 As such, the Court’s more recent decisions, 
despite crisis discourse, have been more migrant-protective than its 
initial judgments on detention, emphasizing the application of 
safeguards for particularly vulnerable involuntary migrants.209 
 Crisis discourse, however, has seemingly had more influence 
though over the Court’s decisions when assessing the conditions of 
migrant detention facilities and Article 3’s protections against 
degrading or inhumane conditions. This crisis effect appears even in 
                                                                                                             
207. Ilias and Ahmed, App. No. 47287/15, ¶ 56. Russia made a similar 
argument that involuntary migrants remained voluntarily in Moscow’s airport, a 
claim that the Court also rejected. Z.A. and Others v. Russia, 3028/16, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
Sept. 18, 2017. The one partial inadmissibility finding issued by the Court has been 
in J.R. and Others v. Greece, App. No. 22696/16, ¶ 86–87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 5, 
2018) (ruling on Article 5 claims regarding the “Vial hotspot,” a migrant reception, 
identification, and registration center set up in an unused factory after the EU-
Turkey Statement went into effect and holding that the claims were inadmissible 
so long as applicants were kept in a semi-open facility where detainees were able 
to go out during the day). 
208. See, e.g., M.K. v. Russia, App. No. 35346/16, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018) 
(finding no Article 5.1(f) violation due to lack of evidence of arbitrariness, bad faith, 
deception, or unjustified delays with respect to the state’s conduct); J.R. and Others 
v. Greece, App. No. 22696/16 (finding no violation because period of detention was 
not excessive); H.A. v. Greece, App. No. 58424/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (applying 
Chahal and Saadi but finding an Article 5.1(f) violation for lack of due diligence); 
J.N. v. UK, App. No. 37289/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (same); H.S. and Others v. 
Cyprus, App. No. 41753/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) (finding an unlawful deprivation 
of liberty in the absence of clear legal basis). 
209. See, e.g., Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, App. No. 
25794/13, 28151/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (minors); O.M. v. Hungary, App. No. 
9912/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (LGBT asylum seekers); Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 
App. No. 56796/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (involuntary migrants with physical and 
psychological illnesses); M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2011) (destitute asylum seekers). 
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judgments where the Court’s Article 5 rulings were not swayed by 
states’ crisis exception arguments.210 
For example, the characterization of a migration crisis 
expressly played a role in the Khlaifia Court’s consideration of whether 
the detention conditions at issue violated Article 3’s prohibition of 
degrading or inhumane conditions. The applicants alleged, and the 
Government did not deny, that the CSPA was overcrowded, holding 
three times its normal capacity at the time of their detention.211 The 
government relied heavily on the context of a migration crisis, namely 
“a situation of humanitarian emergency in Italy” due to “the massive 
influx of North African migrants.” 212  It explained that authorities 
responded to complaints of poor conditions in the CSPA “with the 
requisite promptness in a situation of emergency.”213 
Notably, in Khlaifia’s analysis of the migrant detention facility 
conditions, the Grand Chamber takes into account the allegation of 
crisis: “While the constraints inherent in such a crisis cannot, in 
themselves, be used to justify a breach of Article 3, the Court is of the 
view that it would certainly be artificial to examine the facts of the case 
without considering the general context in which those facts arose.”214 
The Khlaifia opinion rejected the argument that the conditions 
at the CSPA violated the Convention’s prohibition of degrading or 
inhumane conditions expressly on evidentiary grounds, but the Court 
acknowledged that the context of a crisis affected its ruling.215 
                                                                                                             
210. There are notable judgments where the Court ruled that migrant 
detention conditions did violate Article 3, particularly in cases involving notorious 
facilities such as those in Greece and Turkey. See, e.g., Khaldarov v. Turkey, App. 
No. 23619/11, ¶ 31, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 5, 2017) (noting that the Court found Article 
3 violations of the Kumkapi Removal Centre in this and several previous 
judgments); Amadou v. Greece, App. No. 37991/11, ¶ 50, Eur. Ct. H. R. (May 4, 
2016) (relying on the Court’s previous judgments of Article 3 violations concerning 
the specific conditions at Fylakio and Aspropyrgos). 
211. Khlaifia GC judgment, supra note 200, ¶ 142 (describing the conditions 
in the Lampedusa CSPA, including the facilities’ lack of hygienic and sanitary 
conditions). 
212. Id. ¶ 150. 
213. Id. ¶ 155. 
214. Id. ¶ 185. The Court, however, was careful to recognize the “absolute 
character of Article 3” and the fact that “an increasing influx of migrants cannot 
absolve a State of its obligations under that provision.” Id. ¶ 184. 
215. Id. ¶ 197. The Grand Chamber Article 3 ruling reversed the Chamber 
below. Id. ¶ 200. The Second Section’s opinion similarly acknowledged the 
“exceptional situation” to which Italy was responding in the detention of the 
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Subsequent judgments, including Ilias and Ahmed and J.R. 
and Others, have followed the Khlaifia ruling in yielding to the 
discourse of crisis to deny claims of an Article 3 violation. The 
Ilias judgment recognized that “the undeniable difficulties and 
inconveniences endured by the applicants stemmed to a significant 
extent from the situation of extreme difficulty confronting the 
authorities at the relevant time.”216 The Ilias court ultimately ruled 
that the conditions of the Röszke transit zone did not violate Article 
3.217 Similarly, in J.R. and Others, the Court discussed the conditions 
of the Greek “hotspot” in the context of “an exceptional and sharp 
increase” in migration flows to Greece, and acknowledged that this has 
“created organisational, logistical and structural difficulties.”218 
An optimistic reading specifically of the J.R. and Others 
judgment is that the Court issued its decision relying on the fact that 
the dispute addressed a nascent phase of the carceral conditions. The 
Court may not have given the same weight to the argument of a 
migration crisis if the detention conditions had been longer lasting: “In 
applicants. Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, App. No. 16483/12, Judgment of the Second 
Section, ¶ 124, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Khlaifia Second Section 
judgment]. The majority opinion, nonetheless, found the CSPA conditions in 
violation of Article 3. Id. ¶ 136. The Grand Chamber also reversed the Second 
Section’s holding that Italy violated Article 4, Protocol 4’s prohibition against 
collective expulsion, which was a particularly significant development for the 
protection of migrants under the European Convention. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Prohibiting Collective Expulsion of Aliens at the European Court of Human Rights, 
20 ASIL INSIGHTS 1 (2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/1/ 
prohibiting-collective-expulsion-aliens-european-court-human-rights [https://perm 
a.cc/U2KR-HRRD]; Duygu Cicek, Introductory Note to Khlaifia and Others v. Italy
(Eur. Ct. H.R.), 56 ASIL INSIGHTS 2 (2016), https://www.cambridge.org/core/
journals/international-legal-materials/article/khlaifia-and-others-v-italy-eur-ct-hr/
BB3955A266528DC1592BA69695432E73 [https://perma.cc/6JFW-ANU2]; Denise
Venturi, The Grand Chamber’s Ruling in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy: One Step
Forward, One Step Back?, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://
strasbourgobservers.com/2017/01/10/the-grand-chambers-ruling-in-khlaifia-and-
others-v-italy-one-step-forward-one-step-back/ [https://perma.cc/8K2B-FKHB].
Both the Second Section and the Grand Chamber unanimously found that the
Italian government’s detention of the applicants on the ships was not an
infringement of Article 3. Khlaifia Second Section judgment, supra, ¶ 144; Khlaifia
GC judgment, supra note 200, ¶ 211.
216. Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, App. No. 47287/15, Fourth Section, ¶ 83,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 18, 2017). 
217. Id. ¶ 90.
218. J.R. and Others, App. No. 22696/16, 25, ¶ 138, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 28,
2018) (direct quotations translated from the French original). 
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other words, in another case, dealing with living conditions in the 
hotspots at a more recent date, the Court might be less lenient.”219 It is 
an open question whether the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the EU migration legal system generally, will respond to detention in 
a manner that challenges what may become a perpetual emphasis on 
a migration crisis.220 
CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to place the recent European migration 
crisis in context. Specifically, it brought in global migration and 
migration control trends, as well as the power and purpose of crisis 
discourse, to present a critical perspective on the region’s response to 
migration. It then examined the evolution of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights with 
respect to migrants. 
This Article undertook a historical and present-day 
examination of migrant detention judgments by the European Court of 
Human Rights. It evaluated the Court’s judgments in light of the 
European human rights system’s foundational inclination toward 
state sovereignty at the expense of migrants’ rights generally, and 
particularly in cases involving carceral migrant control. The inquiry 
was how the increasingly prevalent discourse of crisis shaped the 
Court’s migrant detention case law. 
The findings are perhaps surprising. A comprehensive analysis 
of the Court’s post-crisis migrant detention judgments reveals that the 
Court has held steadfast to the applicability of the Convention’s 
prohibition of deprivation of liberty, namely that migration detention 
is in fact detention. The case law examination also shows that the 
Court has not deviated from its relatively recent and more migrant-
protective analysis of whether states’ method of carceral migration 
control is lawful. However, the influence of crisis discourse has affected 
the Court’s treatment of migrant detention claims in judgments 
regarding the conditions in which states have held involuntary 
migrants under the specter of migration crisis control. This overall 
picture illustrates both the potential of the European system to extend 
219. Annick Pijnenburg, JR and Others v Greece: What Does the Court (Not)
Say About the EU-Turkey Statement?, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/02/21/jr-and-others-v-greece-what-does-the-
court-not-say-about-the-eu-turkey-statement/ [https://perma.cc/4S9N-S5R9]. 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 37–44.
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human rights protections to migrants and the power of persistent, 
ubiquitous crisis discourse to influence what systems define as human 
rights violations. 
